REVIEW: *WOMEN IN PRAGMATISM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE*

Women in Pragmatism: Past, Present and Future. Eds. Núria Sara Miras Boronat and Michela Bella. Springer, 2022.

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This book combines historical and experiential accounts of the beginnings of feminist pragmatism by the very women who started it, including Marilyn Fischer, Susan Petrilli, and Charlene Haddock Seigfried, with the work of newer generations. The book is a testament to the past, present, and future of pragmatist feminist studies that not only looks to retrieve the names of women in the field but also acknowledges the significance of their proposals. In other words, the book does not aim to identify women pragmatists merely for being women but because their work is important for the history of thought. There is an honest belief that in missing the reflections of pragmatist feminists on their own experiences, we miss a meaningful perspective on life that is important for its own sake and has the power to address old and new problems and to create new outlooks.

For this reason, this book may be of interest to a wide range of readers: For those who look to expand the tradition of pragmatism; for pragmatists who are interested in exploring ways in which pragmatism could be enriched through new experiences; and also for those who love to see how philosophy, in this case, pragmatism, can inform, influence and bring about new experiences for hope in a better world. In short, it may interest those who want to see pragmatism in down-to-earth fashion, including its interwoven interdisciplinary relationships.

The first two chapters of the book go back to the roots and history of feminist pragmatist studies. In the first chapter, Barbara J. Lowe and Marilyn Fischer introduce the antecedents of the pragmatist feminist movement in the United States, particularly in the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP). This chapter highlights the importance of cooperative intelligence in the flourishing of the feminist pragmatist movement. While mainstream philosophical practice, individual efforts were the rule, the experience of the pragmatist feminist encouraged and embraced collective and collaborative efforts to open avenues to make their voices heard and valued during the hostile times of the 70s, 80s, and 90s. Lowe's and Fisher's accounts are valuable not only for their detail but also because they narrate their own reflective experience of how they lived this time of history in feminist and pragmatist philosophy in making explicit many of the biases normalized in the past. Their experiences were kindled not only by a growing interest in feminism but also by the generous and vibrant conversations among different disciplines in a very pragmatic tone. They show us that what feminist theory has to say is valuable because of this common effort, and perhaps more importantly, for its communal and caring practices aimed at flourishing for all.

Lowe and Fisher also analyze the tasks and challenges ahead of us. Inclusion remains a difficulty in the profession of philosophy. Not only are feminism and pragmatism still considered marginal fields of interest but philosophy in general has low rates of graduation and inclusion of minorities in the professional context. This panoramic account of the history and experience of pragmatist feminism makes an effort to connect the professional history of the field with social, political, and personal efforts for flourishing.

In the second chapter, Charlene Haddock Seigfried develops themes from the first. She reflects on the prehistory, both personal and academic, of her groundbreaking 1996 book on feminist pragmatism, *Pragmatism and Feminism*. According to her, "pragmatism needed feminism to realize its own potential and (...) feminism needed to recognize the contributions of American pragmatists to recover its own academic and activist roots"

(p. 15). For her, it was also important to show that if pragmatist theory were to begin with experience, and if there were women close to the pragmatism movement, these women should also have reflected and theorized on their own experiences. Therefore, there should have been some pragmatist feminism. She also reveals that pragmatism has historically been an interdisciplinary philosophy of the borders. This is evidenced by the fact that pragmatism in all of its versions has been interested in experience. However, it also reveals how blind history has been to acknowledging the pragmatist vein in authors like Jane Addams.

In a detailed manner, she recaps the hindrances and transitions. Her exhaustive examination shows how the importance of making feminism culturally visible is not only crucial to improving women's situation in society but also to generate a common search for "friendly philosophical methods" (p. 21).

A very interesting aspect of her analysis is how she describes the transitioning narrative on feminist pragmatism. While early and transitioning feminist pragmatist accounts will point to the affinities between some feminists and pragmatism, post-transitioning accounts of feminist pragmatism will need to recognize feminist pragmatism as a narrative of its own with the capacity for changing and influencing philosophical and historical narratives. Toward this end, she emphasizes the importance of Jane Addams and her influence on pragmatism, particularly the works of John Dewey. Ironically, Dewey has always been recognized as one of the fathers of pragmatism, while Addams was mostly recognized as a cultural thinker, social worker, and pacifist, limiting the influence of her philosophical thought. Throughout her career, Seigfried has drawn attention to Addams' philosophical theory, and her final statement is a evidence of Addams' original pragmatist philosophy, with which Dewey not only felt a kinship but from which he was willing to learn.

Several chapters of the book use pragmatic theoretical tools to illuminate important problems. In her chapter "Toward a Pragmatist and Feminist Theory of Oppression: Thoughts on Class, Gender, and Race," Núria Miras Boronat reflects on how the concept of oppression arose as an important epistemological tool for raising awareness of the habits and subtle norms of mainstream society aimed at perpetuating discrimination against marginalized communities. She tries to explain why these habits were also perpetuated in mainstream pragmatist philosophy. Although affinities among pragmatist women and men scholars were evident, the oppressive experience of women did not reach the reflections of mainstream political pragmatic theory. Following this idea, Miras Boronat reconstructs the pragmatist feminist theory of oppression, on how it "originated," and is "maintained and resisted" (p. 29). She emphasizes the methods and forms of reasoning that Jane Addams, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, W.E.B. DuBois, Jessie Taft, Anna Julia Cooper and Christine Ladd-Franklin used in enriching the pragmatist tradition and the theory of oppression.

Jane Addams' social experimentalism and conception of social vulnerability founded a method for producing social knowledge, with an attitude that was neither paternalistic nor naive. She promoted the acquisition of social and political agency. She applied innovative methods, not only in the use of social cartography to graphically show factors influencing social vulnerability, but also already recognizing intersectional factors that influence these vulnerabilities, such as gender, race, and class. Moreover, she studied prostitution as an exemplar of her overall approach to social illnesses; she did not focus on it as an individual problem but as a social and collective issue that has to be faced collectively.

Núria Sara Miras Boronat exhibits a deep knowledge of the authors she analyzes, not limiting her study to the more theoretical or philosophical texts, but also attending to their various literary expressions. Accordingly, she explores, for instance, the theoretical value of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's poems and fictional pieces for grounding her feminist stance and social theory. She addresses

issues such as the institution of marriage as an exchange of sex for economic stability, and prostitution as a related issue that exposes how the dehumanization of women has not only hindered the possibilities of our literary narratives (limiting women interest to stereotypical subjects like cooking and fashion) but also the possibility of "human amelioration" in general. Finally, Anna Julia Cooper and W.E.B. DuBois provide significant insights on the psychological aspects and repercussions of racism and sexism with concepts such as DuBois' "double consciousness" and Cooper's groundbreaking reflections on the intersectionality of gender and race and her common acknowledgment with Addams of the need for sympathetic knowledge.

With her analysis and account of Victoria Welby's theoretical development, in "On Sense, Meaning, and Responsibility: Victoria Welby's Significs," Petrilli aims to establish her as the founding mother of modern semiotics. Welby's approach to meaning argues against the reification of meaning as the essence of signs and the idea of language as a mere instrument of communication. In contrast, she values vagueness, polysemy, and metaphors as fundamental aspects of meaning that have an important influence on our conduct and our aesthetic appreciation of life. Meaning, according to this, is signifying behavior (p. 46), and language is a synonym for inquiry into otherness.

Thus, Petrilli recuperates Lady Welby's theory of significs or today's semioethics as a field of knowledge that explores the relationship between meaning (or interpretation) and its implications for human behavior. Part of Welby's original work addresses the philosophy of the "Man in the Street," to which her coinage of the term "significs" makes reference, and focuses on the operative pragmatic, ethical, and aesthetic value of meaning.

In exploring Welby's epistolic exchanges, Petrilli testifies to Welby's work as a proof of community work that did not renounce being both critical of and amicable toward the growth of knowledge, while highlighting concepts, such as translation and dialogical interrelation, that show the broad scope and applicability of her theory. Her theory was not limited to verbal behavior and aspired to see what is different as an opportunity to explore the richness and polyphony of experience. In this sense, Welby's project points to an education for a responsible life free of dogmatism and aware of the ideologies and values underneath the way we signify. Petrilli ends her essay by showing all the possibilities of encounter, development, and enrichment that this theory has with other more well-known theories of meaning and communication oriented toward humanism.

Zoe Hurley's chapter, "Feminist Pragmatist Salvaging of Victoria Welby's Theory of 'Ident'," explores Welby's theory of ident by showing how abstract theoretical concepts can engage in vital matters. In this case, she explores how the theory of ident is also related to the "woman question". Welby's theory of subjectivity is based on the idea that an I or Ident is in dialogue with a self, in which the ident is a matrix-of-selves that is not only open to one self but also to others. As a result, subjectivity is strongly grounded in otherness, in contrast to the nominalist perspective of the individual, i.e. individualism, broadly debated within pragmatism. Moreover, this conception of subjectivity is related to the conceptual tool of "feminist pragmatist salvaging", which aims to battle the invisibility of women in the category of "mankind."

"Mother sense" is another concept coined by Welby around 1890 that, according to Hurley, refers to "the intuitive, emotional, and empathetic capacity of human reasoning" present in men and women (p. 56). It is based on this idea that Welby configures her concept of ident as interconnected and dependent on a plurality of factors, such as social, political, and personal relations. Hurley affirms that this conception of a complex and discursive subjectivity is not essentialist and can work as the foundation of a non-essentialist reading of gender. In sum, she claims that the Welbian ident is an important philosophical tool for reflexive pragmatist theorizing of which we are very much in need, and brings to the fore "a global philosophy of connection, care, and empathy" (p. 62).

Llanos Navarro's "Where Are Ethical Properties? Predication, Location, and Category Mistake" introduces a critical review of expressivism and representationalism. While representationalism maintains that ethical claims can be located in place and time, expressivism affirms that ethical claims are expressions of the speaker's state. Navarro's main thesis is that the placement problem is a pseudoproblem based on the pragmatism of María José Frápolli, particularly based on her notion of organic intuition, according to which "to be a proposition is to have propositional properties." Navarro explains Frápolli's eight types of propositional properties or content to show that propositions do not need to be about physical objects but may also address ethics. In other words, Navarro wants to establish that from Frápolli's inferentialist and pragmatic perspective we can ascertain that ethical predicates are meaningful from a logical point of view, if they are also understood as higher order predicables referred to functions of concepts. More interestingly, Navarro explores some of the consequences of this new outlook.

Michela Bella's article, "Unconventional Legacy in American Psychology of Self: William James and Mary Whiton Calkins," revives Mary Whiton Calkins' and William James' humanistic model of psychology. Although James' model is connected with "the great problems of life", it was deemed as unscientific in the field of psychology, given psychology's tendency to value analytic and experimental data as more than reflexive analysis. Against many odds, Mary Whiton Calkins pioneered personality theory in the United States, further developing James' humanistic model. Calkins established three important points in her theory: "First, the methodological primacy of introspection, and the supplementary role of experimental methods (against reductionist psychological theories that biologized psychology). Secondly, her understanding of the self as relational (against the pre-eminence given either to intellectual or sensation elements in consciousness), and finally her Jamesian-sympathetic philosophical understanding of psychology." (p. 72). These points evidence her commitment to a humanistic model of psychology.

Calkins envisioned her psychology as an alternative position that harmonizes the methods and types of psychological analysis provided by structuralism and functionalism, along with Watson's behaviorism, which she considered a type of functionalism. James also shared this harmonizing intention and methodological pluralism. She did experiment on psychological phenomena, but never thought that this experimentation could exhaust consciousness; both James and Calkins thought there was a moral importance and ground in psychology from the perspective of ameliorating human lives. Beyond these kinships, there are points of separation, but, most importantly, developments of her own, such as her examination of the personal sense of the relational side of the experience that still influence the psychological conception of personality. The idea of personality can suffer from a limited understanding if detached from the humanistic conception of psychology shared and developed by James and Calkins as presented by Bella.

Christine Ladd-Franklin forged a name in the development of logic with her contributions. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe explores her work in "Christine Ladd and the Form of Syllogisms," analysing the influence that pragmatism, and most particularly, Peirce's idea of logic had on Ladd-Franklin's thought and the connections and developments she advanced in this field. To illustrate Ladd-Franklin's importance, Pérez-Ilzarbe analyses how she overcame the traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic syllogistic logic by proposing a new form of symbolization that prescinded from the relation between subject and predicate by privileging symmetrical copulas and the "rejection of the inferential perspective" providing a new synthetic form of representation and validation of syllogisms by just one simple rule instead of many, according to the type of syllogism, that is, the antilogism. Pérez-Ilzarbe highlights both Ladd-Franklin's originality and her continuity with Peirce's perspective on logic. Both thinkers thought of logic as a

tool for the analysis of thinking that should be graphic and iconic and that, in her case, allows us to see the form of all valid syllogisms through the antilogism. This also reveals, according to Ladd-Franklin, from a philosophical point of view, that rebuttal rather than concluding is a more primitive form of reasoning—an idea that could open a new way to understand logic or some aspects of it.

In the chapter "Reason, Truth, and Counterexample," A.C. Spivey begin a defense of usability as a trumping value, based on Helen Longino's idea that scientific practices are social in nature and, therefore, value-laden. Values, according to this perspective, affect how we look for evidence and how we evaluate it. Spivey frame their value of usability on Hilary Putnam's theory of truth based on rational acceptability as a way to make flexible the criteria to accept scientific discoveries that allow for their constant evaluation concerning the best evidence.

Facts, theories, and values are related; not only do values affect the way we see facts, but also facts affect the way we value and can change our values. This helps to improve the convergence between our theories and the external world; however, there is never perfect convergence, nor one truth only, but many. Rational acceptability opposes the god's eye assumption that there could be a definitive list of criteria to accept what is or is not true. In particular, to Spivey, counterexamples are not a sufficient criterion to abandon a theory.

Spivey want to make a plea for usability as an important value for truth, that we can find in Jane Addams' perspective as well as in feminist moral philosophers and philosophers of law, for whom a theory that does not help us in grasping and understanding life and the world in general is rather limited, to say the least. To Spivey, usability can trump other values when a theory fails to provide a fully accurate explanation of facts. As a result, a theory can stand if it meets the value and criteria of usability despite the presence of counterexamples.

It would be useful to approach this proposal from a probabilistic perspective, since it would, in my view, corroborate the value of usability but also provide more detail on how this idea is used and can be used in scientific research.

Wellan's proposal shares with Spivey the idea of accepting scientific practice as a social practice since she values perspectivism in attunement with pragmatic views that assume that knowledge is situated in a time and a cultural context, and is permeated by them. In the chapter "Pragmatism and Scientific Perspectivism," Wellan accepts the existence of a commonality between perspectivism and pragmatism and explores how a more relativistic version of pragmatism, defended by James, and a more objectivistic version of pragmatism, traditionally associated with Peirce, can be related to versions of perspectivism. To this aim, Wellan analyses Ronald Giere's and Michela Masimi's perspectivist proposals.

Giere presupposes a unique world that is commonly shared but that can be differently, although not contradictorily, perceived, as in the case of a dichromat and a trichromat observer. This idea can be applied, according to Giere, to the different results we get from processing data on the same object but with different instruments, and the use of representational models to explain some aspects of the world, which differ following the purpose of the scientist. Giere proposes a thoroughgoing perspectivism in which a complete and correct description of the world is not possible (p. 126). There is no objective truth; at most, an intersubjective truth, which we can check in constructivism with sociology and history. Massimi, on the other hand, defends perspectival realism's endorsement of the idea that a theory aspires to truth. This can be so insofar as it corresponds to the "states of affairs in the world" (p. 127), since the world is also mind-independent. In this case, Massimi wants to establish scientific progress and a perspectivist notion of truth as key ideas of perspectival realism.

In this context, for a theory to be true, it needs perspectival sensitivity, different from perspective relativity, and performance adequacy. In other words, it needs to

work according to its purpose and be assessed across theories. If the theory not only works in the context under which it was conceived but can also be useful and validated in other contexts and theories, this is an indicator of its claim of truthfulness or "getting things right." In her case, for instance, cross-validation suggests that natural kinds are real and not merely perspective-dependent.

Welland considers Giere's proposal in relation to James's pragmatism since the latter also maintains that the search for truth is mostly "instrumental human discoveries"; accordingly, there is no absolute truth but there are relative and partial truths. For Welland, both Giere and James agree that there are no mind-independent natural kinds. On the other hand, Welland focuses on Peirce's difference from James in highlighting his idea of "convergence at the end of inquiry" (p. 131), grounded on the existence of a mind-independent reality. Welland claims that in comparing and contrasting these positions can help to provide a better theoretical ground for the possibilities and limits of perspectivism and pragmatic theories of truth.

In "Individuality to Personhood in Dewey's Later Works" Teresa Roversi throws light on Dewey's unfinished task of building a social theory of personhood. She reconstructs a Deweyian theory of personhood based on Dewey's later works, specifically based on his work "Things and Persons," as a concept different from the self and the individual with philosophical potential and implications for feminist thought. Roversi characterizes the individual as the particular behavior or habits built from our natural capacities engaged with the environment, the persona as the connections of these habits to our socio-cultural roles in a community, and the self as a mediator between the habits that spring from our natural characteristics and our particular way to embody them and our socio-cultural habits exhibited through our mind and language. Roversi highlights the affinities between such definitions and feminism to postulate their potential to criticize oppressive social structures. Person is an embodied and, therefore, situated concept, following the importance of habits in its formation. As a result, personhood is a social practice instead of an abstract entity or lifeless fact. According to the author, assuming this perspective allows us to rethink the social and political status of minorities to whom full social and political recognition has not been given, despite the important roles they play in social communities. This lack of recognition is guided by the idea that what they do should be deemed private or instinctual work with no public and political relevance.

Charlie Brousseau explore the pros and cons of objectivity versus feminist standpoint theories in their chapter "Experiences, Objectivity, and Collective Action in Feminism: A Pragmatist Analysis." In their opinion, while standpoint theories acknowledge the political and social context in which theories are rooted, which is important if one expects to change the conditions of life through theory, objective knowledge is still necessary to share a common ground to implement such initiatives. If we side entirely with standpoint theory, particularities and subjectivity would be prevalent, and we would fall into epistemological relativism, in which no common ground of experience could be reached. On the other hand, if we accept objectivity uncontested, experiences could be standardized or homogenized. Brousseau find in Dewey's conception of experience a middle ground, where the standpoint is understood as based on common problems and strategies for solution, more than on an idea of identity. Along the way, they reconceptualize identity using Marion Young's concept of series, according to which a group is a construction produced by the awareness of common problems and shared goals. In this way, individual experiences are not a subjective starting point for knowledge and action, but the final test of particular knowledge that provides objectivity and commonality to problems and possible solutions. Here, they highlight that particular experiences are never totally subjective, since they are interpreted through shared matrices of experience. As a result, Brousseau provide

promising pathways to overcome problems raised by the feminist standpoint epistemology through pragmatism, aiming for a common goal: the possibility of illuminating and empowering our practices through theories.

Pragmatism is usually linked to human progress; this much is true. However, Agnieszka Hensoldt explains, in her chapter "Looking for Feminist Pragmatist Roots of Degrowth Ideas: Jane Addams, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Caroline Bartlett Crane," that progress does not necessarily have to be understood as implying economic and industrial growth. According to the author, we can easily track different ways to understand progress in attunement with ecofeminism in the voices of three pragmatist women: Jane Addams, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Caroline Bartlett Crane. This also explains why ecofeminism originated among women linked to the Department of Sociology of Chicago and Hull House, led by Addams. According to Addams, industrialization and migration demanded a new social morality instead of an individual morality. This idea took form in her conception of democracy understood as a social ethic, aimed at the development of the capacities of its members and a common share in its culture and its economic wealth. However, capitalism –as embodied by 19th century industrialization–created huge social inequalities; and philanthropy, which decided who and how wealth distribution should be provided in a vertical and patriarchal way, both hindered the pathway of democracy, and excluded marginalized people from "active participation in common life" (p. 242).

Gilman similarly criticizes American culture for being oppressive to people and destructive of nature through her works *Herland* and *With Her in Ourland*. In these works, she also denounces the intricate relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, both of which display values around the drive to master and foment the survival of the fittest. Opposite to this, Herland, Gilman deemed, was more in tune with nature in acknowledging the interconnectedness of life and the importance of cooperation. Finally, Caroline Barlett Crane shared Gilman's perspectives on the importance of public space and the care of nature. She was mainly interested in problems of public sanitation and social justice. Her conception of progress was democratic, with public access to natural resources, unpolluted air, beautiful environments, water, and food.

In these three thinkers, we can see the feminist pragmatist roots of the degrowth theory, particularly in their ideas on social, environmental, and climate justice. They stated their conception of progress following ideas of anticonsumerism, social justice, peaceful coexistence between human and non-human animals, communal life and responsibilities, which imply a change in human values opposite to the logic of individualism, domination, and oppression of human beings and nature as promulgated by today's savage capitalism.

To conclude, Hensoldt suggests that these thinkers are not only forerunners of these ideas but that they can also help us in changing our imaginaries of domination towards a more harmonic way of life with our environment.

Lastly, for those interested in approaches that show pragmatism in action and how it informs concrete practices, I would suggest the chapters by Dina Mendonça, "Foundations of Philosophy for Children, Reasonableness, and the Education of Thinking;" Maura Striano, "The Educational Value of 'Mental Non-resistance' and 'Understanding' in Fostering Intellectual and Social Life: A Lesson fom Jane Addams;" Laura Camas Garrido, "Bringing the Origins of Playgrounds into the Current Educational Debate: Jane Addams and the Kitchens of Socializing Democracy;" Àger Pérez Casanovas, "Maxine Greene: Teaching Philosophy in Aesthetic Environments;" Ann Warde, "Instigators of Experimental Artwork: Resonances of Jane Addams in Arts Education;" and Pauline Lefebvre, "The Introduction of Pragmatism in Architecture (1990–2010)—The Role of Women and the Fate of Feminism."

Mendonça's article aims to clarify the notion of reasonableness, a key concept of Philosophy for Children (P4C), but very much under dispute due to its vagueness and generality. To this end, Mendonça recovers

the pragmatic tradition on which it (P4C) was conceived and puts it into conversation with some core concepts of feminism, which, according to her, can provide more clarity. The first two concepts that she puts into conversation are the feminist concept of situatedness and the pragmatist concept of pluralism. Mendonça claims that acknowledging situatedness is an important aspect of critical thinking as well as Dewey's plurality, since in the absence of plurality, there is no other way to tackle biased thinking, to acknowledge privilege, and to address the dynamics of power. In other words, plural voices are fundamental for fallibilism. Other key ideas that resonate between both traditions are the importance of emotions and their education for reasonableness; moreover, from Peirce she recovers the idea of the community of inquiry in underscoring that reasonableness is always a communal and intersubjective experience instead of a private or individual one, that is improved through reflexivity and self-correction. Reasonableness, as a consequence, is a pluralist, communal, intersubjective, reflexive, self-correcting ability that has to be sensitive to the context and should inform P4C practices, as her examples illustrate.

In her proposal, Maura Striano aims to overcome Addams's traditional view as a mere caring and activist figure to bring to the fore the epistemological and practical value of her thought, in connection with her motto: action is "the only medium man has for receiving and appropriating truth" and the "sole medium of expression for ethics." Striano successfully shows how Addams' concept of mental non-resistance inspired Dewey's thought and established the connection and continuity among a situated epistemology, a normative ethic, and a political stance. Mental non-resistance is understood as a willingness to let down one's guard with prejudices and conventions to listen to other people's stories. Here, Addams is depicted as an original thinker greatly sensitive to the problems of her age but also open to the opportunities of amelioration. Hull House is acknowledged as the social experiment in which all these connections were lived and enriched, and where democracy was experienced as a human faith and an ideal, all of which makes Addams' thought much more original and alluring.

Camas Garrido's text walks us through the life and social context of Jane Addams and the problems she saw in industrialized cities, such as Chicago, where society and government did not take responsibility for guaranteeing places of healthy leisure for their people. Addams considered that this approach was fundamental for a healthy society. Parallel with this lack of public responsibility, new forms of leisure arose, permeated by the interests of the market. In this way, the hedonistic life was promoted by industry, while there was no place for the cultivation of imagination. Children and young people were left with no care and adult supervision while working at the factories, and gangs appeared as a social institution where they could learn to exchange acts of corruption for protection. All these factors were the cause of a generalized "aesthetic insensibility." We all share a human playful impulse, according to Addams, that has to be channeled for developing imagination and virtuous forms of organized leisure to enrich spiritual life and imagination as a virtue for democracy. Play is the scenery in which differences are overcome and comradeship is built with a sense of cooperation and justice through sympathetic knowledge.

In reconstructing the metaphor of the settlement and the playground as sociological laboratories, Camas Garrido proposes another image that is more in tune with Addams' project, "the kitchens of democracy". The playground and the settlement were spaces that allowed for continuity between the public and private spheres, which also enabled women to face public life and work. Industrialization liberated the domestic sphere of women, and Addams made an effort to liberate women by bridging the gap between both spheres of action. Finally, Camas Garrido proposes a new way to read our reality through Addams' theory in the defense of play as educative in the context of industrial life, parallel with what we face today with digital play spaces. The author claims

that they take the form of the commercial leisure analyzed by Addams, and challenges us to question if there could be new ways to establish a more caring, safe, and democratic way to use these digital spaces.

Àger Pérez Casanovas' chapter "Maxine Greene: Teaching Philosophy in Aesthetic Environments" recovers the importance of Maxine Greene's idea of aesthetic education and its impact on the teaching praxis. Greene was a contemporary pragmatist for whom education was key, and despite the current attempts to keep women's thought visible, she has also been overlooked. Greene was a Jewish woman profoundly impacted by Sartre's philosophy understood as the "development of a fundamental project" of life. She defended education for democracy and Dewey's conception of philosophy as the general theory of education in which this is conceived as "the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow-men." She also developed Dewey's concept of aesthetics as an experience that provides formative opportunities to liberate imagination, create awareness, and enable plurality--an important value for democracy. Pérez Casanovas interweaves different milestones in Greene's life with the evolution of her thinking, from the concepts of autonomy to relationality and the conception of aesthetic education as a situated experience that puts ourselves in caring relation to others. This idea is also informed by Pérez Casanovas' own experience as a teacher, which brings in an inspirational approach to Greene's theory.

In her essay, "Instigators of Experimental Artwork: Resonances of Jane Addams in Arts Education," Warde explores how the experimental work of Phoebe Harvey James, in teaching music and making music for children throughout the United States's school system, incarnated the idea of progressive education theorized, exercised, and promoted by Jane Addams and John Dewey. James's work is a clear exemplar of pragmatism, mainly due to its focus on child-centered activities and participatory methods of active learning. Moreover, given the close relationship and collaborative work between James and her nephew, John Cage, Warde claims that this analysis could also be extended to explain the link that other scholars have found between John Cage's works as an artist and pragmatism.

Following a deeper analysis, Warde explores some essential ideas from Addams and Dewey, which show their influence on James's approach and evidence how her work furthers pragmatist ideals of democracy and inclusion. From Addams, the author underscores her critical, insightful, and active collegiate discussion and activities with Dewey and George Herbert Mead around Hull House, where constant experimentation took place to make democracy and its promise of "equal access to economic and social resources" real. Warde recovers Dewey's idea of philosophy and education for democracy as a way to facilitate the constant adjustments needed to embrace plurality through experimentation. Dewey claims that to learn something, you have to do something with things, that is, you have to purposefully participate in the events to learn how to meet ends. According to Warde, this type of participation and experimentation is present, for example, in James's proposal of reconstructing the sounds and attitudes of animals. Children observe, participate, and recreate in a unique way the activities and behaviors of these animals and incarnate the theory of rhythm. The development and channeling of the play impulse and imagination are key to Addams, as we have seen in previous chapters, and Warde focuses on the integrating force of game and artistic expressions among children as well as on its capacity to engender the expression of identity and character. Warde's detailed description of how James structured her music, and how its apparent incompleteness left a place for self-expression and creativity, shows these intricate connections. Warde understands James's and Cage's music as a "carrier of pragmatism" that, against all odds and the sidelinedness of pragmatism during the 20th century, survived throughout the culture of the United States.

Finally, Pauline Lefebvre develops how the incursion of pragmatism influenced the debate in architecture around the critical and postcritical tradition, in her chapter "The Introduction of Pragmatism in Architecture (1990–2010)—The Role of Women and the Fate of Feminism." Joan Ockman was the first scholar to introduce pragmatism into this debate, however, its reception was problematic, since it was used to articulate the postcritical stance without a real connection to the pragmatic tradition. Lefebvre aims to recover Ockman's original initiative, which addressed two main problems: the role of theory in architecture, which was so predominant that it made them forget that architecture should focus on use and experience, and the political stance of architects against the logic of capitalism. Up to this point, according to Ockman, architects were left without tools to resist this logic, and pragmatism could offer such tools. Moreover, Lefebvre wants to underscore the role of Joan Ockman and Gwendolyn Wright in introducing pragmatism to architectural theory and, through them, "the fate of feminism" (p. 215). On the one hand, Ockman's efforts to include pragmatism in the discussion mostly aimed to make architecture a socially engaged practice, aware of its social consequences following the "evolutionary, organic and democratic" traits she found in pragmatism (p. 218).

On the other hand, although Wright was mainly interested in finding heirs of pragmatism in architectural proposals, characterized by their social and environmental commitments, and practices of participation and inclusion, she also indicated how pragmatism's attention to the social and the political could develop a natural relationship with the theories on feminism and architecture, despite its general rejection in the academic context. This idea was later welcomed by scholars as Mary McLeod and Sherry Ahrentzen, and nowadays enjoys a more favorable context for its acceptance, thanks to the work of these authors, in changing the practical and political approach to theories in architecture.

In this collection of essays, readers will find a wide range of interests and perspectives situated in the knowledge of women conversing with past, present and future problems pragmatic feminist fashion. This promises to broaden our horizon of thought beyond cultural, administrative and academic boundaries, to offer new creative possibilities for growth in pragmatist philosophy and its borderlands. Moreover, the vitality of this tradition, its breadth, and usability, as stated by Aubrey C. Spivey in her article, attest to its compelling aspiration for comprehensive and pluralistic ideas of truth and democracy.