

INTERSECTIONALITY AND FRAGMENTATION¹

Kathleen Wallace

Hofstra University

kathleen.wallace@hofstra.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper considers the scope of the concept of intersectionality and the extent to which it may be generalizable as a characterization of identity formation or is specific to marginalized identities. Several meanings of intersectionality are examined – as lived experience, as category, as analytical framework. The paper tentatively suggests that generalization could facilitate challenging the normative center. The paper concludes with a discussion of intersectionality and community. Building on Patricia Hill Collins' suggestion that there is a potential synergy between intersectionality studies and American pragmatism, the paper introduces the concept of experiential parallelism to develop the notion of community in relation to overlapping intersectional identities.

Keywords: intersectionality, lived experience, category, feminism, community, pragmatism

Section 1. Introduction

The concept of intersectionality was first introduced by Crenshaw (1989, 1991) to identify the particular kind of discrimination experienced by black women, discrimination that could not be reduced to one or the other category “black” or “woman” *and* that was not merely the sum of particular discriminations, but was, in virtue of their working together, itself a particular discrimination. Since then there has been a great deal of work done exploring and expanding on the definition, use and application of intersectionality. Even though intersectionality initially referred to the intersection of locations of domination and subordination, I thought it could be a generalizable concept, referring to the intersection of multiple locations constitutive of a self – interpersonal, physical, biological and social (and that are not necessarily or only ones of power).

In spite of my own interest in a more generalizable concept, I have wondered whether generalizing would detract from its specific purpose in the context of American Black Feminist thought where ‘intersectionality’ has a

lengthy genealogy from Sojourner Truth to the Combahee River Collective’s Black Feminist Statement (published in 1977)², and continuing in the work of contemporary Black feminists and theorists of race and color. Crenshaw (1989, 1991) wanted a way to identify and remedy the multiple dimensions of oppression and injustice experienced by black women. As such, intersectionality identifies the discrimination that a black woman suffers in virtue of both her race and her gender. As remedy, intersectionality suggests that multiple-axes analysis of anti-discrimination laws is needed. In so far as antidiscrimination law is dominated by a single-axis analysis, whereby discrimination in virtue of race or in virtue of gender are treated as distinct and mutually exclusive categories, the law fails to capture the scope of multidimensionally based discrimination and does a poor job of remedying black women’s legal disadvantages.

Thus, ‘intersectionality’ has signaled the need to focus on a particular problem and to be a corrective to legal and conceptual frameworks that have treated identities as singular and generic. Recognizing the complexity and multiplicity of oppressed people’s experiences and self-identifications is important not only for accuracy and for acknowledging an individual’s lived experience, but also for developing an account of justice that can, in practice, more adequately address the injustices that people actually experience.

Still, I would like to explore the generalizing move for the concept for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, the concept seems quite apt for capturing the interrelated plural constitutedness of selves. Practically, generalizing the concept could have the salutary effect of possibly dislodging a normative center that tends to be seen as not intersectional. Conceptualizing all selves as intersectional could also, perhaps, open pathways for communication and solidarity, and mitigate the fragmentation that sometimes accompanies a focus on particularity alone. Perhaps intersectionality is a way of having both, particularity and solidarity across difference.

¹ I would like to acknowledge support for this work by Hofstra University and by Dartmouth College, where I have been a Visiting Scholar in the Philosophy Department. I am also grateful for the feedback from the participants in the Central European Pragmatist Forum at which an earlier version of this paper was presented in June 2018.

² A Black Feminist Statement: the Combahee River Collective is reprinted in Hull, et.al. 1982.

'Intersectionality' has been used to identify a variety of forms of (multiply constituted) social oppressions, not only those of black women. A second, more generalizing move would conceptualize all social identities, both those of oppressor and oppressed, as intersectional, in a system of intersecting and mutually constituting relations of power, of domination and subordination. A third, even more generalizing move, would be to extend intersectionality to any self as multiply constituted by the intersection of many traits and locations some, but not all of which are about domination or subordination. Imagine, for instance, the person who is a dual citizen, speaks several languages, lives and moves between cultures and countries, who is also middle or upper class and not oppressed or marginalized in the way in which black women or other persons of color are in the U.S. or in the way in which a Chicana lesbian may be with respect to her Latine origins. If intersectionality is about complexity and multiple constitutedness more generally and not necessarily limited to contexts of oppression and domination, it would not be defining of marginality per se; marginality and oppression would be a kind of intersectionality.

I am not the only one to have thought of intersectionality as a more general concept. Bernstein, for instance, provides a good list of a variety of referents for the term 'intersectionality' that can be found in use.

[I]Intersectionality refers to a few different phenomena. Sometimes it refers to members of intersectional social *categories*, like black women. Sometimes it refers to forms of oppression faced by members of such categories, for example, those forms of discrimination faced by black women that are faced neither by women alone nor by black people alone. Intersectionality sometimes refers to a type or token of *experience* faced by members of such categories, as in experiences had by black women that are not entirely explicable by appeal to being black or to being a woman. There is a *causal* theory of intersectionality, according to which intersecting systems of power produce effects on groups or individuals that would not be produced if the dimensions did not intersect. And intersectionality sometimes refers to a method of *theorizing* from or about a specific viewpoint, as when one is theorizing from the perspective of a disabled Jewish woman. (Bernstein 2020, 322)

Bernstein goes on to say that she will focus on the first, intersectional identity categories. She also suggests that everyone's identity, not only those of minority, oppressed persons, is intersectional, meaning that everyone's identity is characterized by distinctive forms of oppression *or of privilege* (my emphasis). However, she is explicit that she will restrict her focus to "intersectional categories as they relate to forms of interlocking systemic oppression" rather than intersectional categories full stop (323).

I will come back to Bernstein's analysis, but here I just want to note that she makes the move to the second generalization I noted, namely, that everyone, both oppressed and privileged has intersectional identity. This has to be right if oppression occurs in virtue of systemic structural power relations. Oppressive and privileged positions are had, sustained by and enabled for occupants in virtue of their positions in the system. I want to note that this move leads naturally to the third generalization identified previously. Aspects of persons that are shaped and constituted by relations of domination and oppression may also "intersect" with (be related to) other self-constituents that are not exclusively determined by domination/oppression, such as "parent," "English speaker," "left-handed," "sixty-four inches (or 1.6 meters) tall" and so on. These connections suggest to me that intersectionality is a broader phenomenon, rather than only about how power relations produce specific kinds of identity and oppression and privilege. I am not going to press this last generalization here but do want to press the second.

As a practical matter, an argument might be made that intersectionality has been and should be restricted to the first and second use. Reasons for restricting it might include (1) that generalizing the concept is a kind of expropriation of the concept that would weaken its meaning and efficacy in the contexts in which it arose and the uniqueness of the problem it was originally meant to illuminate; (2) that, in some of its uses, intersectionality is descriptive of a particular kind of lived experience, not all experience, and that as such it allows

for recognition of identities that have hitherto been invisible; and (3) intersectionality is not only about how individual identities are constituted in part by social identities, but is specifically about the interlocking systems of oppression in which those social identities are embedded. On the other hand, if intersectionality designates a particular kind of identity or lived experience, that seems to run at least two risks (1) making communication, understanding and solidarity across particular different intersectional identities even more difficult than it already is; and (2) further reinforcing marginalization – if only oppressed persons are “intersectional,” then would intersectionality not really challenge the norm of domineering homogeneity, “purity” and lack of complexity? This seems worrisome normatively and as a matter of definitional multiplication and splitting. I’ll call both of these “fragmentation” risks.

Section 2. Intersectionality, identity, lived experience

In my first encounter with intersectionality, I was struck by its generalizability, as a way of understanding the complexity and multiplicity of all persons. Every person is constituted by an intersection of multiple social (and biological, psychological, political, cultural, and so on) positions. Those who occupy socially dominant classes are no less intersectional than anyone else. A white, heterosexual man in the United States who is college-educated, a native English speaker, a U.S. citizen, of White-Protestant background, middle-class, son, uncle, is also intersectionally socially constituted. His relative privilege and assurance of rights are a product of a system that valorizes some of those identities. Or, a white, heterosexual woman, of Irish-Catholic background, college-educated, middle-class, a U.S. citizen, a native English speaker, philosopher and professional academic, sibling, aunt, friend, and so on. Her relative status and privilege in society are a product of a system which valorizes, or at least doesn’t undercut her multiple identities, with the exception of gender. She experiences disadvantages in virtue of gender, but some of her other

locations (e.g., being white, college educated) may tend to mitigate the disadvantages of gender, or at least prevent them from being worse than they might be either on their own, or in connection with other disadvantaged positions (such as being poor and/or uneducated). For a black woman, on the other hand, the disadvantages she experiences *qua* woman are compounded and worsened by her race.³

On this approach, intersectionality wouldn’t be unique to those who are marginalized or oppressed. Whether intersectionality contributes to marginalization and injustice, whether it is a basis for disadvantage and the extent to which it is, would depend on how constitutive features are valorized and structured in and by the social system that includes power relations and structures of domination and subordination. Social identities may be freighted, or not, and whether they are may be due to historical, socio-economic, political, religious, and other cultural factors. For example, at one time, in the United States being Irish or Italian and Catholic were culturally marked locations that were the basis for much discrimination; they were identities that one would have had to negotiate and that posed great challenges for selves constituted by those identities.

But, for Black feminist theorists and for other theorists working on issues of oppression and injustice, intersectionality is specifically about the lived identity, experiences and locations of oppressed or marginalized persons. Appropriating the term for more general use, particularly if it is done without acknowledging its origins and genesis, has been characterized as “whitening” intersectionality (Bilge 2013) and robbing it of its power to grasp, conceptualize, and name the specific lived

³ Haslanger’s analogy of overlapping theatre lights is one metaphor for conveying the intersectionality of an individual’s experience and identity. (Haslanger, 2014, 116). Another metaphor emphasizes inseparability or even fusing of categories: “Different liquids – milk, coffee, nail polish, olive oil, beet borscht, paint in several colors – run down from different places at different altitudes into roundabouts. Some of the liquids run together, some are marbled with others, and some stay more separate unless whipped together” (Garry 2011, 833). Neither of these represents how structural oppression actually works; for that you’d want an analysis of how structures interact.

experience of oppressed persons.⁴ There might also be the worry that by generalizing the use of the term, it decenters race as having a kind of primacy.⁵ This concern might be particularly salient for Black feminism and its criticism of Anglo-European feminism for being mostly about white, middle class women's issues, and as exclusionary of Black women and more widely, women of color. Part of the point of intersectionality for Black feminists was to point out that gender alone, especially as treated in (white) feminist analyses, did not fully capture the lived (and oppressed) experience of Black women. Rather, black women are doubly oppressed, and race is central to how they experience gender discrimination.⁶

As a matter of lived experience, intersectionality is more salient for oppressed and marginalized persons than it is for those who, even if they may be multiply and relationally constituted, do not necessarily experience themselves as such. Here the argument would be that white, heterosexual men in the U.S. tend to experience

themselves as, and be recognized by others as, unified agents, homogenous or whole, precisely because or in so far as they are not marginalized. As the normative center, their agency is not multiple or fragmented because it is not called into question but operates without the kinds of self-monitoring and self-consciousness of aspects of themselves that marginalized persons experience and have to negotiate. The woman who has to self-monitor enacting and expressing her competence (rather than just being competent) and who is therefore self-consciously, self-questioningly female, not just an agent; the Black person who strives for academic success while at the same time rejecting the label that doing so is "acting white" and who is therefore self-consciously, self-questioningly black and not just an agent.

Even if white heterosexual males may be no less plurally constituted, their privileged status hides that. As a matter of lived experience, privilege lies in being the norm, in "being normal," and leaves unthematized particular aspects of selves.⁷ Marginalized or oppressed persons *experience* themselves as at the margin, as not the normative center. In addition, if intersectionality also involves the collision, or mutual reinforcement, of different forms of oppression – e.g., racism and sexism – then marginalized persons may also experience themselves as fractured, as experiencing a "contradictory pulling and tearing" between features that distinguish them from the norm.⁸ In that case, intersectionality would describe,

⁴ Others explicitly reject this interpretation of intersectionality as too narrow, and not consistent with what Crenshaw herself says about it (e.g., Carbado 2013).

⁵ Race is a contested category and I'm not going to define it or otherwise clarify it. And at least in the United States, there has been so much intermingling that even people who identify or are identified as black or as white are often of mixed genetic origin, whatever their cultural or other identities might be.

⁶ It is also possible that context matters. In the U.S. healthcare setting black maternal mortality rates are three times that of white maternal mortality rates; here it looks like race is the salient discriminatory factor. But, given that women in general are taken less seriously in the healthcare system, gender may also be a factor. In other words, females tend to fare worse in the healthcare system than males, even if it is also true that *black* females fare worse than white females, and black males fare worse than white. On the other side, black males are more likely than black females to be the target of police violence, and in this context, while race is salient compared to white males, gender is salient compared to black females. Of course, as Crenshaw has argued, violence against black women is quite prevalent, but tends to not garner the same attention as violence against black men does. She argues this may be yet another dimension to the particular kind of oppression and discrimination experienced by black women, in this case, that injustices to them are not as widely recognized, but are marginalized (Crenshaw 1991; see also, the #Say Her Name project). The point here was only that multiple social categories do not necessarily operate in fixed ways such that they always produce double-jeopardy, or triple-jeopardy, but that context may also matter. See Beale 1979 on double-jeopardy theory. Intersectionality has also become of interest in medicine and bioethics. See, for example, the February 2019 issue of the *American Journal of Bioethics* 9, no. 2.

⁷ This is not to say that white, heterosexual males cannot experience themselves as marginal. Class can be powerful in this regard, as seen, for instance, in the account by J.D. Vance in *Hillbilly Elegy* of the ways in which he was and felt marginalized in comparison to his law school classmates at Yale (even though the book may also underestimate some of the advantages he had as white). As a white, heterosexual male his ability to move from the margin to the normative center is considerably enhanced compared to a white woman or to a black man or black woman because he already meets the eligibility criteria, so to speak, which neither a woman nor a Black person will ever meet. Class, at least conceptually, may allow for more choice and fluidity than race. It makes sense to say that one could move from poverty into the middle-class; and much less sense to say that one could move from being black to being white, or vice versa, Rachel Dolezal notwithstanding. (See also note 10 below.)

⁸ Milczarek-Desai (2002, 128) uses that phrase "contradictory pulling and tearing" adding in to the mix of race and sex, the experience of being from another culture, in her case, that of India.

would name the distinctive experience of the marginalized person, and in particular that of one who experiences multiple forms or layers of discrimination, inequality, oppression or marginalization. Collins calls the layers of discrimination the “matrix of domination,” making explicit that the subject of analysis is not neutral, but specifically involves power relations of domination and subordination.⁹ On this account, intersectionality identifies a particular kind of fraught, fragmented lived experience of marginalized, oppressed persons and would not be appropriately extended, as a matter of lived experience to those in dominant or privileged positions. Intersectionality would be about the experience of *particular* multiple oppressions and inequalities, and not about the complexity and multiple constitutedness of those who are privileged (let alone of persons in general).¹⁰

Another aspect of intersectionality understood as specifically about the lived experience and identity of marginalized, oppressed persons, is that the marginalizing identities are often conceptualized as not chosen or voluntarily relinquishable.¹¹ While that is also true for

the white, heterosexual male, those identities are not disadvantageous and do not contribute to oppression, but just the opposite. The “matrix of domination” is characterized by the arbitrariness with which categories (race, sex/gender, ethnicity/culture) are the bases for recognition of capability, for access to social and economic opportunity, for fair treatment under the law, for social and economic rewards and benefits.¹²

Sometimes the claim seems to be that intersectionality is about not just oppression but the very complexity of constitution of marginalized persons, and that this identity is distinctive. There may be something of a tension between conceptualizing intersectionality as a (negative) lived experience of oppression, inequality, domination on the one hand, and on the other hand, conceptualizing intersectionality as a complexity of identity that is not sufficiently recognized by the dominant, privileged perspective. One mechanism of oppression is to label and to take apart without recognizing the wholeness of a person’s complex identity (the fracturing and pulling apart mentioned previously). In contrast, intersectionality also asserts the complexity of identity as something to be celebrated, rather than fragmented, or diminished through stereotyping, categorizing or other more nefarious forms of discrimination and oppression. Intersectionality as a way of rendering visible identities that had hitherto been invisible is expressed by Anzaldúa’s (1983) comment about the irreducible complexity of her identity/identities:

a rift in the editorial board of *Hypatia* and in academic feminism more generally. I am taking no position on any of the issues involved in Dolezal’s case; just observing the criticism that has been made of her claim. I am also setting aside questions about mixed racial identity, which is often a factor in being able to “pass.”

¹² That mobility and choice are thought to be at least partial determinants of class might be a consideration against class being a truly marginalizing category. The argument might go that even if it is true that in fact there is very little movement out of one class into another (with notable exceptions), still it is conceptually meaningful and in principle possible to move into one class or another. However, class is a strong contributor to inequality and marginalization. Even if class itself is not a justiciable inequality, other social categories (race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion) that are intersect with it, and for the purposes of fully understanding oppression, class cannot be wholly discounted.

⁹ “Intersectional paradigms make a second important contribution to untangling the relationships between knowledge and empowerment – they shed new light on how domination is organized. The term *matrix of domination* describes this overall social organization within which intersecting oppressions originate, develop, and are contained... As the particular form assumed by intersecting oppressions in one social location, any matrix of domination can be seen as an historically specific organization of power in which social groups are embedded and which they aim to influence... All contexts of domination incorporate some combination of intersecting oppressions, and considerable variability exists from one matrix of domination to the next as to how oppression and activism will be organized” (Collins, 2000, 227–228).

¹⁰ McCall (2005) calls this approach to intersectionality the intracategorical, meaning focused “on particular social groups at neglected points of intersection” (1774).

¹¹ One of the criticisms of Rachel Dolezal invokes this point, namely, that her *choosing* to self-identify as black is itself an act of privilege, and not a choice that the typical racially marginalized person has. Rachel Dolezal self-identifies as Black and was for a time the head of the NAACP in Spokane WA. She resigned that, and other, posts when it was revealed that Dolezal was born to and raised in a White conservative Christian family. Her family of origin adopted several children of color whom Dolezal helped parent. She subsequently, in 2010, became the legal guardian of one of her adopted brothers after she became estranged from her family. A discussion of Dolezal and “transracialism” by Rebecca Tuvel in an article published in the journal *Hypatia* (2017) instigated a very public, contentious dispute and

I am a wind-swayed bridge, a crossroads inhabited by whirlwinds... What am I? A third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings. They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label... One foot on brown soil, one on white, one in straight society, one in the gay world, the man's world, the women's, one limb in the literary world, another in the working class... Who, me confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me. (Anzaldúa, 1983, 205)

While Anzaldúa does not use the term, the concept of intersectionality is implicitly at work here and is meant to distinguish, and celebrate, marginalized persons as distinctively multiply constituted (contrasting that with the homogeneity and unlayeredness of those who are privileged or dominant). Part of the nature of oppression consists in being labeled, reduced to a stereotype, and fragmented such that one's identity is not recognized or accepted qua multiple.

Lugones (2007) argues further that intersectionality renders visible the node of oppression, but also requires moving beyond "separable categories" and perceiving categories such as gender and race as fused:

Intersectionality reveals what is not seen when categories such as gender and race are conceptualized as separate from each other. The move to intersect the categories has been motivated by the difficulties in making visible those who are dominated and victimized in terms of both categories. It becomes logically clear then that the logic of categorical separation... distorts what exists at the intersection, such as violence against women of color. Given the construction of categories, the intersection misconstrues women of color. So, once intersectionality shows us what is missing, we have ahead of us the task of reconceptualizing the logic of the intersection so as to avoid separability. It is only when we perceive gender and race as intermeshed or fused that we actually see women of color. (Lugones 2007, 192–193)

In this quotation, Lugones is arguing for resisting the tendency to split apart and stereotype people. She is also emphasizing that part of what a person wants is recognition of their complex identity as a whole, not broken apart into its particular locations or characteristics. As a matter of lived experience, her point is that a person is a whole who resists reduction to parts or as-

pects of themselves. Lugones is also pointing to lived experience as itself the basis or source of categories. Recognition of intersectional identities as arising out of lived experience is a long standing dimension of intersectionality studies from its origins in Black Feminist thought in the nineteenth century – think of Sojourner Truth's interrogation of the category "woman" through her lived experience of exclusion from it – through the present.¹³

In this section we have been discussing intersectionality as lived experience, as identifying a way in which marginalized or oppressed persons experience their identity and have developed the very concept of intersectional identity out of that experience. The Lugones quotation above also raises some interesting issues about the nature of categories, specifically about separability and what Lugones calls the "logic of purity" versus the logic of impurity, about sameness and difference.¹⁴ I now want to consider some of these issues.

Section 3. Intersectionality and Categories

There are two aspects of the categories of social identity that I want to consider, one is their generalizability, and the other is their separability or distinctness.

Intersectionality is a powerful way of theorizing difference and recognizing the distinctiveness of marginalized people and their multidimensionality, and in particular the multiple burdens experienced by those who are marginalized and oppressed. At the same time, if applied only to marginalized or oppressed persons, that would seem to imply that some people are relation-

¹³ Truth 1995, 37 See also, Gines 2011, 276, where she reviews Black Feminist thought in America and its development of intersectional analyses.

¹⁴ See also Lugones 2003. Garry (2011) argues that the locations that form intersectional identity – e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity – are family resemblances, such that persons sharing one or two, but not all, still have some commonality and basis for solidarity. Garry agrees with Lugones's project to pluralize feminism and recognize distinct forms of oppression and experience, while at the same time is concerned that giving up separable categories altogether undermines recognizing the bases for commonality, solidarity, and common social justice action. Lugones herself recognizes the problem of fragmentation and disempowerment (Lugones 2003).

ally complex and others (those who are dominant) are not. But, if everyone is embedded in systems of power relations, then everyone's identity is structurally shaped, albeit in different ways depending on whether one's position is dominant or oppressed.

Critics of intersectionality argue that by revealing inter- and intra-group differences, it leads to particularism, fragmentation, divisions, instead of unity in political organizing.¹⁵ Some have argued that intersectionality can be understood as not only about identity formation of marginalized subjects, but as a general theory of identity formation (Kwan 1997; Nash 2008). If intersectionality were more broadly understood, if everyone were to recognize themselves as shaped by multiple social identities, rather than those who are dominant being positioned as in some sense independent of such identities or as outside the system of oppression, then perhaps that would promote the possibility of solidarity across groups. Seeing intersectionality as addressing the position and agency of the privileged and powerful would make it clearer that the dominant too are shaped by and shape their position.

Recognizing their own intersectional location might facilitate better engagement with the problem on the part of those in the more privileged position. By this I do not mean that those who are privileged are also multiply burdened.¹⁶ I mean only that being privileged is itself a systemically located advantage, rather than something

deserved in virtue of individual merit or qualities.¹⁷ This does not mean that the epistemic perspective of marginalized persons is diminished; rather, the thought is that by locating the perspective of privilege in the same system it shows the arbitrariness of that privilege and weakens the claim of entitlement to privilege in virtue of those social categories. That is not to relieve or mitigate responsibility for exploitation and domination. Even if some oppressive behavior is unconscious, unintended or a byproduct of systemic relations, much of it involves the active agency of those in dominant positions. And even when it doesn't, but is the former, recognizing oneself as a participant in a social world that is unjust is a precondition for recognizing oneself as bearing some responsibility to repair that world.¹⁸ Intersectionality has the potential to expose that and the ways that social structures enable and support it.¹⁹ I think this is what Carbadó (2013) is getting at at the conclusion of his essay:

The point of departure for this essay was the idea that many scholars frame intersectionality more narrowly than is theoretically necessary. I then proceeded to employ intersectionality to analyze social categories, civil rights problems, and legal doctrines that are ostensibly beyond the theoretical reach and normative concern of intersectionality. My hope is that this engagement will end some of the abstract debates about what intersectionality can and cannot do and encourage more scholars to push the theoretical boundaries of intersectionality rather than disciplining and policing them. (841)

As a social category, intersectionality identifies social (broadly understood) characteristics. As we have seen, there are questions about what social characteristics or identities should or could be included in the category of intersectionality – whether intersectionality is about marginalizing categories or can be about any social categories.

¹⁵ For example, critics would include Ehrenreich 2002, Ludvig 2006. Cole (2008), on the other hand, argues that "conceiving of identities intersectionally, as coalitions, illuminates 'new avenues of cooperation'" (447). Carastathis (2013) develops this idea further, analyzing *Somos Hermanas* and the "coalitional praxis of Carmen Vázquez," and criticizing some categorial approaches to intersectionality as too rigid. Carastathis suggests that we have to be more creative and define categories as more fluid. Carastathis's analysis is of coalitions between marginalized groups, not between marginalized and non-marginalized, but it seems to me that the latter is also a possibility of intersectionality broadly understood.

¹⁶ We might note that there can be degrees of privilege even among those who are burdened, and perhaps some degrees of burden among those who are privileged. Some of those differences may not be significant for political purposes or for redressing injustice but are worth noting with respect to the nuance and complexity of any identity formation and any position in a social system.

¹⁷ Whatever other aspects of an individual's capabilities, effort and actions may contribute to judgments of desert.

¹⁸ While there is not space here to do so, Young's social connection model of responsibility would be apt to developing further this point (Young 2006).

¹⁹ Walby (2012) argues that an "ontology of inequality" needs to focus not only disadvantaged people or sets of people as that obscures the role of the powerful in unequal social relations (232).

Additionally, in the discussion of lived experience we saw that there is a tension in how to think about the inter-relatedness of the categories or identities themselves and how separable or fused they are. I appreciate the point about fracturing and stereotyping that Anzaldúa and Lugones highlight in a person's lived experience, but I want to push back a bit on the notion that the categories are fused. Fusion would imply that categories become indistinct from one another such that membership in the category "Black Woman" for example has nothing in common with membership in the category "Chicana Lesbian Woman." Each has its own unique category with constituents fused in such a way that there wouldn't be overlap, so to speak, with constituents of another intersectional identity. Even though the same term, e.g., 'woman', is used, it is not even a partially shared category because the real categories are "Black Woman" and "Chicana Lesbian Woman."

I understand the arguments against reifying the notion of woman, against essentialism, and against naive universalizing, as in "all women are x" or "all women want y" or "all women should band together." However, if the term 'woman' is meaningful it can't be that its distinctness qua category is destroyed in an intersectional identity of which it is a constituent. It remains, in some sense, an intact category (albeit not reified or essential). At the same time, the intersectional category is greater than the sum of its parts as an explanatory and analytical category. Bernstein's (2020) analysis of the intactness of the constituent categories *and* the explanatory priority of intersectional categories is a very clear exposition of the point.

Rather than the conjuncts explaining the conjunction, the conjunction explains the conjuncts. The intuitive idea is that in understanding black womanhood, we thereby understand blackness and womanhood. *Being a black woman* explains being black and being a woman; features of blackness and womanhood are at least partially explained by black womanhood. Intersectional explanations are more informative than explanations exclusively involving the individual identity constituents. (Bernstein, 2020, 331)

Bernstein's argument is that intersectionality has explanatory and metaphysical primacy (332), but that this way of understanding it is neutral on the "comparative fundamen-

tality of the constituents" and entails that one need not view any one constituent category as more fundamental than another (333–334). This seems to me to capture the crux of what makes intersectionality such a powerful category of analysis, which, at the same time, is consistent with the experiential integrity of intersectional identity, a point that Bernstein recognizes as well. Allowing for the intactness of the distinct constituents, though, could provide a path to solidarity and community. Even though intersectional identities may be unique, they are not wholly exclusionary either. A Black Woman Philosopher can have solidarity with others who are black (who may not be philosophers, and who may not be women), with others who are women (but not black and/or not philosophers), with black women (who are not philosophers), with philosophers (who are neither black nor women), with women philosophers (who are not black) and with black philosophers (who are not women). The point is that while being a Black Woman Philosopher explains that person's integrated, intersectional experience of being black, being a woman and being a philosopher, the intactness of the identity constituents also means that there can be contexts in which those subaltern constituents are shared with others and can be bases for some explanatory clarity and for solidarity and the formation of some joint commitments, coalitions and actions.

Section 4. Intersectionality: Category and Analytical Framework

As I have been arguing intersectionality²⁰ can be considered as not only naming lived experience, but as providing categories or a framework for analysis. This idea goes back to Crenshaw. Hancock observes that intersectionality is not only a category for understanding complex identity, but identifies an analytical approach:

²⁰ In a review of the genealogy of intersectionality research over a twenty plus year period, Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (2013) identify three approaches that have been taken: one that focuses on specific contexts of discrimination and oppression, another that focuses on intersectionality as theory and methodology, and a third that focuses less on analysis and more on praxis of social reform.

Originally I thought of intersectionality as a content based specialization that emphasized the subjectivity of women who reside at the intersections of race-, gender, class-, and sexual orientation-based marginalizations (and other categories of difference)... [T]his kind of work has taken place in multiple locations simultaneously, often unbeknownst to intersectional scholars immersed in their study of a specific intersectional group. This immersion explains why some scholars claim an exclusive origin for intersectionality in the specific intersectional group they study. Similar to the political subjectivity of the women they study, the origins of intersectionality are multiple and intersecting. A comprehensive intellectual history of intersectionality research has yet to be published.

[I]gnorance to a comprehensive intellectual history of intersectionality research masks the ways in which intersectionality 1) can answer new questions as yet unanswerable with traditional models and 2) can generate strategies for political change that incorporate all of us as political beings, not simply a subset of the population discussed in a single comparative case only. I have therefore recently gravitated toward a position claiming that intersectionality is a normative and empirical research paradigm (Hancock 2007; see also McCall 2005), rather than a content specialization. (Hancock 2007, 248–249)

The contrast here is between intersectionality that is about identity and lived experience (what Hancock calls “content based specialization” in the subjectivity of women living at the intersection of race-...)²¹ and intersectionality that is a paradigm for analysis.²² For Hancock it is a paradigm for analysis of public policy, particularly for public policy as it pertains to those typically identified as intersectional subjects on the first meaning, but also more broadly (Hancock 2007, 251). Hancock characterizes intersectionality as a research paradigm for analysis and data collection that is “attentive to causal complexity” (Hancock 2007, 251).²³

Even if in origin it was developed in order to provide a framework for analyzing the multiple layers of oppres-

sion and inequality experienced in being black and being female, there doesn't seem to be any in principle reason why as a conceptual framework it couldn't be generalized. As Crenshaw herself originally said²⁴,

I should say at the outset that intersectionality is not being offered as some new, totalizing theory of identity. Nor do I mean to suggest that violence against women of color can be explained only through the specific frameworks of race and gender considered here.⁹ [sic; this is Crenshaw's footnote and is included in the next quotation] Indeed factors I address only in part or not at all, such as class or sexuality, are often as critical in shaping the experiences of women of color. My focus on the intersections of race and gender only highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed.

And in her footnote 9, Crenshaw adds:

I consider intersectionality a provisional concept linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory. In mapping the intersections of race and gender, the concept does engage dominant assumptions that race and gender are essentially separate categories. By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable. While the primary intersections that I explore here are between race and gender, the concept can and should be expanded by factoring in issues such as class, sexual orientation, age, and color.

And more recently Crenshaw suggested,

Implicit in this broadened field of vision is our view that intersectionality is best framed as an analytic sensibility. If intersectionality is an analytic disposition, a way of thinking about and conducting analyses, then what makes an analysis intersectional is not its use of the term “intersectionality,” nor its being situated in a familiar genealogy, nor its drawing on lists of standard citations. Rather, what makes an analysis intersectional – whatever terms it deploys, whatever its iteration, whatever its field or discipline – is its adoption of an intersectional way of thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to power. This framing – conceiving of categories not as distinct but as always permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating and being created by dynamics of power – emphasizes what intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is.²⁵

²¹ This would fall under the first approach identified in the previous footnote.

²² This would fall under the second approach identified in footnote 4.

²³ Hancock refers to the work of the sociologist Charles Ragin on fuzzy set methodology in sociology for analyzing variation, diversity, multiplicity, intersectionality, and causal complexity (Ragin 2000).

²⁴ Crenshaw 1991, 1244–1245.

²⁵ Cho, Crenshaw, McCall 2013, 795.

Intersectionality could function as a framework for analyzing many sorts of discrimination and inequality. Kwan uses intersectionality to analyze the negligence of white, male police officers in overlooking the abuse of a young, Asian, gay male and allowing themselves to be persuaded by Jeffrey Dahmer that the young male's condition was just part of a "boyfriend-boyfriend" thing.²⁶

In addition, analyses of oppression, discrimination or inequality might focus on matrices of domination and subordination, on certain kinds of hierarchical locations (rather than social roles more generally) and how they interact.²⁷ As providing a category or framework, intersectional inquiry might produce an analysis that conflicts with or remains unfelt or unnoticed by the subjects who are so located. Or, an analysis of intersecting (interlocking?) social mechanisms and processes of subordination and domination and of inequality may identify causal processes and relations that are not directly experienced and would not feature in a standard narrative of lived experience.²⁸ On this approach, identity, and specifically subordinated identities, are the outcome of power dynamics (MacKinnon 2013, 1023), and intersectionality studies examines the relationship between identity and power as determinative of subordinated positions.²⁹ Intersectional locations of the subordinated are thematized in ways that the locations of those at a normative center may not be.

²⁶ Kwan 1997. The victim had escaped and was found naked, bruised and bleeding in the street by neighbors who called the police. He was Laotian and had trouble speaking (although that was due to his injuries and trauma, not to his ethnicity), and the police returned him to the "care" of Dahmer (Jeffrey Dahmer was a serial killer in Milwaukee in the late 1970s through 1991). That the victim had escaped but was returned to Dahmer is particularly tragic in light of the horrific suffering Dahmer inflicted on this victim – at 14, also underage, another feature overlooked by the police officers – and four other subsequent victims before he was apprehended. Kwan suggests using the term "cosynthesis," rather than "intersectionality," which he thinks allows for more fluid and dynamic understanding of categories and their mutual interaction.

²⁷ Collins distinguishes between macrolevel analyses of *interlocking* systems of relations and microlevel processes that are *intersectional* and about how individuals and groups occupy their places in interlocking systems.

²⁸ See for example Tilly 2002.

²⁹ A number of essays in the 2013 special issue of *Signs*, edited by Cho, Crenshaw and McCall explore this set of issues. See MacKinnon 2013, Tomlinson 2013, Spade 2013, Verloo 2013, Lewis 2013.

Still, it continues to seem worrisome to set off intersectional positions of subordination or oppression as fundamentally different *qua* intersectional from positions of domination. As Carbado puts it (2013),

Framing intersectionality as only about women of color gives masculinity, whiteness, and maleness an intersectional pass. That, in turn, leaves colorblind intersectionality and gender-blind intersectionality unnamed and uninterrogated, further naturalizing white male heterosexuality as the normative baseline against which the rest of us are intersectionally differentiated. (841)

Subjecting the normative center to intersectional analyses³⁰ as well could produce a deeper understanding of power relations and counteract narratives of individual desert or merit that ignore the ways in which the very position of being the center, the position of dominance is dependent on and sustained by social structures and relations.

Section 5. Intersectionality and Community

I have been emphasizing mostly theoretical issues, but there is an ethical imperative at work here regarding the need to actively engage social justice. There are, of course, many issues and hurdles to moving from theory to action, recognition and cooperation. Here, and in concluding, I want only to indicate how, building on a suggestion by Collins, community and thematizing intersectionality might facilitate taking steps in disrupting power and addressing inequality and oppression.

Collins introduces the importance of community via consideration of what pragmatism might contribute to intersectionality studies. She (2011, 2012) observes a kind of fragmentation occurring in intersectionality studies, wherein intersectionality studies pay increasing attention to individual, particular identities and in so doing, may be losing focus on collective identities and on the commonalities that are necessary for forging and

³⁰ I do not mean to suggest that the standpoint of the subordinated, oppressed, disadvantaged or discriminated against should be supplanted or replaced by a hegemonic viewpoint masquerading perhaps as the "universal", but that the theory can and should account for the positionality and interdependence of the privileged, just as much as it can express the standpoint of the oppressed (see also e.g., Walby, Armstrong, Strid, 2012).

sustaining solidarity and social reform. Rather, Collins (2003) suggests that every group occupies a location of “heterogenous commonality” (221). Collins suggests that pragmatism, and its emphasis on community, may be a helpful ally to and have a synergistic relation with intersectionality.

In essence, the robust understandings of identity politics honed within social movements have been increasingly challenged within contemporary social theory. Individual identities and the personal politics that accompany them seem acceptable. In contrast, collective identities are less so. Here American pragmatism’s well-developed history of the social self, experience, and the significance of symbols all affecting the construct of community provides a set of tools that potentially might counteract this drift toward decontextualized, individualized identities. Pragmatism’s analysis of the social self developed in the context of community provides a provocative argument concerning experience that scholars of intersectionality might find especially useful. Conversely, intersectionality’s analysis of complex social inequalities might stimulate pragmatist analyses of communities as infused with power and politics. Stated differently, linking conceptions of identity politics honed within social movements with pragmatism’s complex analyses of community discussed above might catalyze an especially fruitful dialogue. (Collins, 2012, 453)

Drawing on a concept from the work of Justus Buchler, I want to gesture towards a way in which intersectionality and community can be fruitfully related. Borrowing from Buchler, I suggest that community be understood as experiential parallelism – Buchler would say “proceptive parallelism” (Buchler, 1979, 34, 38). Community is possible because there is some commonality –not necessarily exact similarity – of experience that provides a basis for communication to take place.³¹ Commonality or “experiential parallelism” doesn’t have to be “thick”; it could be as thin as being in the same place at the same time and subject to a set of risks, consequences, causes, or meanings distributed in the situation. Serendipitous and transient communities that spring up in urban environments are examples of such fleeting and “thin” communities.

But the kind of community that I think Collins has in mind is one in which identities form some kind of experiential parallelism that calls for thematization of some aspect of one’s identity. Examples of the former: the experiential parallelism of Black feminist lesbians forming a community; or, an experiential parallelism of women in the U.S. forming a community, one that might *partially* intersect with the former, but neither in the whole nor as one that simply subsumes (and obliterates) the specificity of the former. In this approach, community would have to be understood as not necessarily intimate or deeply interpersonal. That would be a kind of community. Rather, community as experiential parallelism is more general; it is a kind of commonality that is a condition for the possibility of communication, coalition and action.

Collins (1993) offers the example of a college classroom as a context in which thematization of identities might take place. Being a student in the classroom constitutes an experiential parallelism that does not obliterate other intersectional identities of the students. Collins suggests that in the classroom different locations in a system of privilege and disadvantage were “equalized” such that genuine dialogue could take place (36–37, 39). I don’t know how apt “equalization” is, although that may be an ideal in the classroom context. But the students’ experiential parallelism *qua* students would be a common condition for the possibility of communication, in Collins’ terms, “dialogue.”

In Collins’ example, a young white man had his position of privilege thematized and disrupted by being confronted with reports of the experiences of black students. The white student (not without resistance) became aware of his and of their positions in a system of power relations. The experiential parallelism involved both the dialogic context of the classroom *and* the developing awareness of each as occupying both common (*qua* student) and different but mutually interdependent positions in the system of power relations, as having “intersectional identities.” When it goes well, both those who are typically subordinated and those who are more

³¹ For a treatment of community (experiential parallelism) and what I call reflexive communication, see Wallace 2019, Chapter 5, 114–141.

typically privileged have their relative positions challenged and modified (at least temporarily in that context) while at the same time recognizing themselves as having those positions or identities in that matrix of domination – their intersectionality has become (or has the opportunity to become) thematized.

The students have experiential parallelism

1. in virtue of the context of the classroom, and
2. generally, as occupants of a system of social structures and power relations, even though they occupy different positions in it, and
3. as also occupying some overlapping positions.

For instance, white and black males may have some overlap in virtue of being male, even though “whiteness” and “blackness” may also differentially affect their positions as male. All the students have some overlap in virtue of being students, even though they might have different reasons for and interests in attending college or in taking that particular class.

I’m thinking that this general experience of experiential parallelism as “heterogenous commonality” could be fruitful as a step in realizing that oppression and inequality are not just the concern of those who are subordinated, but of everyone. Not because everyone is oppressed, but because everyone is intersectionally located and has, in varying degrees and respects, some overlapping identities and positions, even if they have them in distinctive ways.

This phenomenon provides some support for generalizing intersectionality as characteristic of all social positions and for taking identity constituents as retaining some intact meaning that can be shared and a basis for experiential parallelism and ultimately communication. The possibility of community depends on experiential parallelism, and that requires some commonality. I am suggesting that generalizing intersectional identity and recognizing some intactness (without reification or essentialization) to identity constituents could allow for recognizing both commonality and difference. I am not arguing that there is a universal “thing” – “humanity” – that we all have. I am suggesting only, that intersection-

ality characterizes all of us – Collins’s “heterogenous commonality” *and* that in some contexts some “categorical constituents” (being male, being a student, being black, being of a particular economic class) may overlap, that is, be locations of which persons are mutual members. Difference need not mean fragmentation and the undermining of solidarity and cooperation, precisely because intersectional identities entail that differences and commonalities overlap and can therefore, be a basis for community, communication, and the solidarity needed for coalition building and action. As Cole put it, “although intersectionality may be misconstrued to suggest a politics of identity [of] vanishingly small constituencies, in fact the concept holds the promise of opening new avenues of cooperation” (Cole, 2008, 447). As observed by Carastathis (2014, 311) doing so would build on Crenshaw’s call at the end of “Mapping the Margins” to view identity-based groups not as monoliths, but as coalitions, constituted by internal differences as much as by commonalities (Crenshaw, 1991, 1299).

References

- American Journal of Bioethics. 2019. Vol. 9, no. 2.
- Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1983. “La prieta.” In *This Bridge Called My Back*. 2nd edition. Eds. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa. Watertown, Mass.: Persephone Press.
- Beal, Frances M. 1979. “Double jeopardy: to be Black and female.” In *The Black Woman: An Anthology*. Ed. Toni Cade, 90–100. New York: New American Library.
- Bernstein, Sara. 2020. “The metaphysics of intersectionality.” *Philosophical Studies* 177: 321–335.
- Bilge, Sirma. 2013. “Intersectionality Undone: Saving Intersectionality from Feminist Intersectionality Studies.” *DuBois Review* 10:2 (2013): 405–424.
- Buchler, Justus. 1979. *Toward A General Theory of Human Judgment*. Second, revised edition. NY: Dover Publications.
- Carastathis, Anna. 2013. “Identity categories as potential coalitions.” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 941–965.
- Carastathis, Anna. 2014. “The Concept of Intersectionality in Feminist Theory.” *Philosophy Compass*, 9 (5): 304–314.
- Carbado, Devon. 2013. “Colorblind intersectionality.” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 811–845.

- Cho, Sumi, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Leslie McCall. 2013. "Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications and praxis." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 785-810.
- Cole, Elizabeth R. 2008. "Coalitions as a model for intersectionality: From practice to theory." *Sex Roles* 59 (5-6): 443-453.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 1993. "Toward a new vision: Race, class, and gender as categories of analysis and connection." *Race, Sex & Class* 1(1) (Fall 1993): 25-45.
- Collins, Patricia Hill, et.al. 1995. "Symposium on West and Fernmaker's Doing Difference." *Gender and Society*, 9 (4): 491-513.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. Second Edition. Routledge.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2003. "Some group matters: Intersectionality, situated standpoints, and Black feminist thought." In *A Companion to African-American Philosophy*. Eds. Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman, 205-29. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2011. "Piecing together a genealogical puzzle: Intersectionality and American pragmatism." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*. III (2): 88-112.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2012. "Social inequality, power, and politics: Intersectionality and American pragmatism in dialogue." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 26(2): 442-457.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. "Decentralizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1989: 139-167.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43(6): 1241-1299.
- Ehrenreich, Nancy R. 2002. "Subordination and symbiosis: mechanisms of mutual support between subordinating systems." *UMKC Law Review* 71(2): 251-324.
- Garry, Ann. 2011. "Intersectionality, Metaphors and the Multiplicity of Gender." *Hypatia* 26 (4) (Fall 2011): 826-850.
- Garry, Ann. 2012. "Who is Included? Intersectionality, Metaphors and the Multiplicity of Gender." In *Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy*. Eds. Sharon L. Crasnow and Anita M. Superson. Oxford University Press. (This version contains longer, more detailed notes than Garry 2011)
- Gines, Kathryn T. 2011. "Black Feminist Thought and Intersectional Analyses: A Defense of Intersectionality." *Philosophy Today* (SPEP Supplement) 55, 275-284.
- Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2007. "Intersectionality as a Normative and Empirical Paradigm." *Politics and Gender*, 3(2): 248-254.
- Haslanger, Sally. 2014. "Race, intersectionality and method: reply to critics." *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for the Study of Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 171 (1): 109-119.
- Hull, Gloria T., Patricia Bell Scott, Barbara Smith (eds.). 1982. *All of the Women are White, All of the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us are Brave: Black Women's Studies*. Old Westbury: The Feminist Press.
- Kwan, Peter. 1997. "Intersections of race, ethnicity, class, gender and sexual orientation: Jeffrey Dahmer and the cosynthesis of categories." *Hastings Law Journal* 48: 1257-1291.
- Lewis, Gail. 2013. "Unsafe Travel: Experiencing Intersectionality and Feminist Displacements." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 869-892.
- Ludvig, Alice. 2006. "Differences between women? Intersecting voices in a female narrative." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13(3): 245-258.
- Lugones, Maria. 2003. "Purity, Impurity and Separation." In *Maria Lugones, Pilgrimages/peregrinajes: Theorizing coalition against multiple oppressions*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Lugones, Maria. 2007. "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System." *Hypatia* 22 (1): 186-209.
- MacKinnon, Catharine. 2013. "Intersectionality as Method: A Note." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 1019-1030
- McCall, Leslie. 2005. "The complexity of intersectionality." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 30 (3) (Spring 2005): 1771-1800.
- Milczarek-Desai, Shefali. 2002. "Living Fearlessly With and Within Differences: My Search for Identity Beyond Categories and Contradictions." In *This Bridge We Call Home: Radical Visions for Transformation*. Eds. Gloria Anzaldúa and Analouise Keating. Routledge (2002): 126-135.
- Nash, Jennifer. 2008. "Re-thinking Intersectionality." *Feminist Review* 89: 1-15.
- Ragin, Charles. 2000. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spade, Dean. 2013. "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 1031-1055.
- Tilly, Charles. 2002. "The Trouble with Stories." In *Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: 25-42.
- Tomlinson, Barbara. 2013. "To Tell the Truth and Not Get Trapped: Desire, Distance, and Intersectionality at the Scene of Argument." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 993-1017.
- Truth, Sojourner. 1995. "When woman gets her rights, man will be right." In *Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought*. Ed. Beverly Guy-Sheftall. New York: The New Press.
- Tuvel, Rebecca. 2017. "A Defense of Transracialism." *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*, 32 (2): 263-278.

- Vance, J.D. 2016. *Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis*. Harper Collins Publishers.
- Verloo, Mieke. 2013. "Intersectional Cross-Movement Politics and Policies: Reflections on Current Practices and Debates." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38 (4): 893–915.
- Walby, Sylvia, Jo Armstrong, Sofia Strid. 2012. "Intersectionality: Multiple Inequalities in Social Theory." *Sociology* 46 (2) (April 2012): 224–240.

- Wallace, Kathleen. 2019. *The Network Self: Relation, Process, and Personal Identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Young, Iris Marion. 2006. "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model." *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 23(1): 102–130.