

**ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENT PLANNING:
A DEWEYAN PERSPECTIVE ON DISPERSED INTELLIGENCE AND
RATIONAL DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION**

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ABSTRACT: Liberal scholars have often warned that social planning must not be modeled after the image of individual rational choice. Jon Elster for example alleges that unlike in the case of deliberating individuals who can directly access and query their personal knowledge, in political settings information and intelligence are dispersed amongst the members of a community and cannot be centrally accessed in a useful manner. I outline how Dewey's philosophy of intelligent action and democracy could solve the problem of collective intelligent coordination. Instead of relying on mysterious social self-organization, or piecemeal approaches to social planning, Dewey offers a theoretical foundation for intelligent problem-solving on the societal level. His notion of science plays a central role in modelling a pluralistic democratic and capable process, avoiding the two extremes of technocracy and disintegration.

Keywords: social intelligence, rational social planning, democracy, inquiry, Dewey

**Deliberate Planning and Dispersed Intelligence –
A Liberal Worry**

In his essay, "The Possibility of Rational Politics," Jon Elster (1991) explains why policy-making should refrain from trying to conform to a model of rational action taken after the image of individual rational choice. He voices several indictments against using the same measure of rationality for collective deliberation (planning) and individual forms of decision-making. One of these indictments states that, unlike rational choice in individual decisions, in collective decision situations information and intelligence are dispersed amongst the members of a community, where they remain ultimately beyond the reach of any central planning agency. In this paper I will look at this question and ask what Dewey's notion of collective or "effective" intelligence has offered to mitigate the daunting conclusion that rational or intelligent social policy making should be impossible.

A number of liberal scholars (e.g. Hayek 1945, Popper 1961) made the point against socialist planning, that a central planning bureau cannot make efficient deci-

sions because it lacks access to crucial market information that remains dispersed among both decentralised consumers and producers, and only manifests itself in free equilibrium prices. If rationality were defined as making the best use of all available knowledge in guiding action and strategies, the very idea of rational social planning would be spurious. Some libertarian anarchists and incrementalists argue that centralised planning would fall far behind those decentralised social deliberation mechanisms like free markets, or simply private life choices, which are better apt to employ prevalent intelligence and dispersed knowledge bases. Others tend to trust in incremental patchwork policies that rely on improvisation and offer *ad hoc* solutions to problems in a trial and error fashion (Popper 1961, Lindblom 1973).

A committed liberal, Dewey (1996 [1882–1953])¹ rejects all centralised forms of social control (cf. Ryan 1995 for an extended discussion of Dewey's dispute with Walter Lippman, DeCesare 2012). Planning intelligence cannot be monopolised by a ruling elite. Dewey further acknowledges that many aspects of intelligent social coordination do not require central planning or explicit public deliberation. That is, not all forms of *social* intelligence (i.e. intelligent forms of collective coordination) are necessarily the product of *public* deliberation. However, deliberate public intelligence requires participants to understand and plan their collective action. For Dewey, social benefits of decentralised and individual management of affairs need not be contrasted with public efforts at achieving social coordination.

Dewey rejects the idea that centralised authoritative planning would be the right method for solving the problems of society, but he also opposes those liberals who infer from the decentralised nature of skills and crucial information bases the need to eschew any form of deliberate collective planning (LW 11.32):

When conditions had changed [transition from authoritarian to early liberal societies] and the problem was one of constructing social organization from individual units that had been released from old social ties, liberalism fell upon evil times. The conception of intelligence as some-

¹ All references to Dewey refer to the collected works (Dewey 1996 [1882–1953]), and use the standard form of citation.

thing that arose from the association of isolated elements, sensations and feelings, left no room for far-reaching experiments in construction of a new social order. It was definitely hostile to everything like collective social planning.

Dewey contradicted those who privilege *private* decision-making over the social and collective forms of deliberation because the argument of dispersed knowledge and intelligence does not imply an advantage of private over collective decision-making (LSA LW11).

To understand Dewey's conception of intelligent collective deliberation we must remember the intimate relationship between "knowledge" and "coordination" in his work (e.g. MW14, LW12, LW14)²; coordination is a transactional notion that sees agency as a set of processes and relations within a situational whole. According to Dewey, even the most personal beliefs cannot be fully understood as located in a private mind. They comprise a relationship between an agent and her (social) environment. Dewey speaks of "the intelligence, the knowledge, ideas and purposes that have been integrated in the medium in which individuals live" (LSA LW11.49). An IT consultant is dependent on the context of a highly developed technical surrounding and an infrastructure of business processes to which he must continuously adapt. Without this context his training and abilities would not only be useless, they would also be meaningless.

This insight is good enough to refute the claim that decentralised coordination must primarily rest on *private* beliefs or choice. We may also get the sense that decision-making is always a social process. But the argument does not yet indicate how we can rehabilitate the idea of deliberate and intelligent social planning on any significant collective scale.

² These two are not identical of course, since coordination can be achieved accidentally. Knowledge incorporates the anticipated consequences of our action into our coordination. It is defined as a disposition or a readiness to uphold coordination in a way that is able to "unify" a situation.

The Public

Before discussing the possibility of a truly collective form of intelligence as a foundation for rational planning, I will take a brief look at Dewey's concept of the *public*. Dewey defines the public as that space where private actions and interactions have social externalities which require remedial actions and policy intervention (LW 2.252).

This concept can easily be misunderstood as a way of separating the realm of private management (negative freedom) from that of legitimate societal intervention. Here I suggest a slightly different reading. A sharp separation between the *private* and the *public* as two domains of sovereignty contradicts both Dewey's concept of the individual and his concept of a public sphere. According to Dewey, participation is constitutive for individual freedom. This is a stronger claim than saying that the individual is socially embedded or that community relations and a sense of belonging are constitutive for an individual's freedom to choose meaningful actions. For Dewey, participation in collective deliberation processes is necessary for the individual to grow to her full potential, even though Allan Ryan argues that *The Public and its Problems* aims precisely at distancing Dewey's position from the Aristotelian idea of a *zoon politicon* by giving the public a functional definition. I still maintain that Dewey's idea of modelling a nation as a "community of communities" still holds on to an organic understanding of a polity. On Dewey's account, the "public" is not merely a domain of policy intervention, separate from a protected space of individual freedom of choice; it is rather a platform for determining a shared way of life and as a source of genuine individuality.

Dewey's definition of the public as necessitated by externalities of private transactions does not imply the separation between domains of management and influence (state vs. private), but the distinction between two different aspects in human practices. Dewey's philosophy is particularly relevant in contemporary contexts where we are often reminded that most private decisions have unanticipated long term and remote consequences.

Beyond private decision-making and the laws of the market, we need a level of deliberate intelligent planning, because, by definition, we cannot leave these problems up to the chance of self-organisation, since that is precisely where they originate. How can we do justice to the insight that intelligence is potentially decentralised without falling back on the sceptical position of *laissez faire* liberalism or the *post hoc* and *ad hoc* repair workshop of incremental “piecemeal social engineering” (Popper 1961).

If we believe that invisible hands must not remain invisible and that people use intelligence and projective imagination to foresee ramified and long term consequences of their actions; if we, like Dewey, believe that people have a say in their destinies and can improve their situations with foresight and effort, we still need to ask *how* this may be possible. How can there be collective rational or “intelligent” forms of *deliberation*? How can we as collectives employ capacities like projective imagination, deliberate coordination of complex actions, the estimation of side-effects, externalities and long-term consequences, and sensible employment of resources? And how, Dewey would add, can we make sure that all these tools and instruments serve us to grow both individually and as a community?

Disenchantments

For a pragmatist like Dewey, the link between collective intelligence and social planning must be forged by experience and cannot remain an untested theoretical construct if it should inspire sufficient trust to embark on comprehensive social reforms. Sidney Morgenesser’s quip that “pragmatism works in theory but not in practice” may yet turn out to be the greatest disparagement of Dewey’s trust in the intelligence of deliberative democratic democracy as a form of scientific inquiry. In recent years, voices sceptical of the quality and intelligence of democratic participation in deliberative projects have grown louder (Brennan 2016).

J. S. Mill still imagined that the mere act of participation in democratic processes could enlighten people and

enable them to appreciate other perspectives and sharpen their argumentative analytic skills in reasonable debates. Much to the contrary, recent empirical studies show that participation in political processes can narrow people’s views and exacerbate ideological rifts and tribalism. Diana Mutz (2011) claims to offer evidence for an inverse relation between exposure to opposing political views in dialogue and the readiness to participate in the political process. People who can be motivated to participate in politics tend to be those who have limited “cross-cutting” political exposure and enforce their view in echo-chambers. This notion may boil down to the truism that individuals who are ready to invest themselves in the political process have an agenda expressing a well-defined political position, which must be one-sided enough to serve as a platform. However, this leaves open the empirical concern that additional exposure to the opposition and meaningful dialogue with other perspectives may dampen people’s readiness to get involved in political deliberations.

Dan Kahan and Donald Braman (2006) affirm that non-expert voters have the intelligence or capacity to understand scientific facts and form their judgments independently. Yet People think and vote as members of reference communities. Their frames of reference work as “cultural commitment[s and] operate as a kind of heuristic in the rational processing of information on public policy matters”, which does not amount to a disparagement of human intelligence but rests on an analysis of the social psychological *modus operandi* of real participants. Jason Brennan (2016) offers a rationalist explanation of tribal voting against better knowledge and readily accessible information. He claims that due to the low likelihood of having a measurable impact on outcomes in elections, people have a reason to use votes as mere expressions or “banners” of their social identities. I believe the argument from low stakes of swaying decisions to a rational justification of tribal voting is weak and it could easily be turned on its head; the low chance of swaying an outcome could just as well motivate individuals to vote in accordance with their better

knowledge even where short-term personal interests were at stake. It would hardly be irrational, by a narrow definition of instrumental rationality, to cast a vote in favour of an environmental policy that demands sacrifices, if there are no good reasons to expect that casting the vote will causally bring about this policy (or that it could be prevented by it). That people clearly do not behave this way in reality requires a different explanation than reference to rational choice. Cultural commitment and identity seem very important here. More important and relevant for the present project is telling just what determinates collective intelligence relies upon; and more specifically, under what conditions the democratic deliberation process will become a source of intelligent planning rather than an expression of prejudice and parochialism.

Sloman and Rabb (2016) argue that we do not distinguish sharply between what “I know” and what “others know”. We rely on a “hive mind” (Fernbach and Sloman 2017) of shared knowledge that individually we can only partially comprehend in forming our action guiding beliefs. Again, but in a more convincing way, these authors argue that the “irrational” confidence in our limited individual knowledge relies on a “rational” trust in collective knowledge. This reliance on a “hive mind” cannot only explain, so Fernbach and Sloman, why people believe fake-news and conspiracy theories, but also why empirically well-founded scientific breakthroughs occur that we can collectively utilize. Perhaps this view underestimates the individual’s capacity to break out of the hive mind, or at least individually to grasp the key theoretical underpinnings that give any rational backing to shared background beliefs. Science must be understood as a shared practice where researchers necessarily rely on previously obtained results (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). These authors see science more as a system of trust than an institutionalized form of scepticism. At the same time, critical inquiry requires a high level of autonomy (Volbers 2018), and this autonomy is at the center of the very idea of science.

From the Scientific Community to Democracy

In his recent work on the rationality of experience, Joerg Volbers (2018) attempts to develop a non-formalist pragmatist theory of empirical scientific rationality. He identifies critical autonomy as the hallmark of modern rationality and he asks how a post-positivist, post-formalist approach to experience can achieve two things: (1) that reason maintains its critical autonomy in theory formation, while (2) experience provides a meaningful grounding and constraint for theorising. After post-analytic anti formalist philosophers like Davidson and McDowell have pointed at the impossibility of separating theory and observation or conceptual scheme and content, Volbers turns to Dewey for a fundamental re-orientation of the modern notion of rational scientific autonomy. Volbers concludes a new determination of scientific rationality as a form of critical autonomy that does not see itself as standing beyond experience, but understands itself as part of an experienced situation, in which experience ceases to be mere recorded data and becomes an encompassing transactive process. The criteria and methods for rational empirical theory appraisal are not given independently from the process of making experiences. Dewey makes it clear that the methods (logic) of inquiry cannot be defined from outside the process of experiences, as both rationalists and classical empiricists presumed alike. Scientific rationality is not a separate instance presiding over experience, but it is part of the doings and undergoing that constitutes experience. Experience is itself conceived of as a potentially intelligent process. By the same token, scientific rational autonomy stops being an independent transcendental rational authority and it becomes the freedom to co-shape experience actively and to transform situations reflectively through inquiry. This further means that science cannot be defined by any fixed rational method or critical procedure. According to Dewey, that which makes science a distinguished rational process is the intelligence of inquiry to define and solve problems, to learn and transfer from one problematic

situation to another and to develop and revise ever new methods of inquiry on the way.

In an analogous vein Talisse argues that deliberative democracy cannot rely on ultimate theoretical fix points and rational principles established prior to the democratic deliberative process:

... [A] pragmatist deliberativism cannot be developed fully by a single theorist, and perhaps it cannot be developed fully at all; its continuing development is the work of a deliberating democratic polity (Talisse 2005 p. 98).

Just as does the political community, the scientific community finds itself “thrown” into situations. Science must develop and revise not only hypotheses and experiments but also its methods for testing, criteria for success and failure, values and priorities guiding research, and the paradigms within which it operates. Dewey’s deliberative democracy is concerned with re-negotiating its agendas, policies, procedures, communication channels, public symbols, majorities and opportunities for participation. It too is lacking external theoretical anchors or authorities. Yet it has, at every moment, the opportunity to utilise the very same instruments of imagination and self-criticism that make science an intelligent pursuit; and this promise will go a long way in view of obvious prevailing shortcomings such as ineffective problem-solving, inefficiency or wastefulness with resources, poor communication and participation channels, and parochialism & tribalism. Pragmatism is a melioristic philosophy, in which intelligence will be measured by successive restructurings of problematic situations and experimental learning. For this reason, both pragmatist science and politics appear helpless and confused at times, which exposes both to charges irrationality and inefficiency. But this very position enables continuing learning and improvement within complex indeterminate and precarious situations.

Dewey has little use for the idea of science as gradually approximating *the* truth or even gradually “fixing beliefs.” However, he agrees with Peirce in that beliefs and ideas can be knowledge in the full sense only when they are shared and owned by a community (PP LW2.371):

Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought.

For Dewey, as for Peirce, scientific inquiry is a practical matter through and through regarding both its occasion (“doubt”) and its results (“belief”). But Dewey goes further than Peirce. Peirce never saw everyday challenges of living in a community as a direct source of a doubt which would call upon the scientific attitude and *scientific* inquiry as a response. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is not limited to the institutional domain of scientific research, but is a theory of accomplishing life with its vagaries, and thereby very explicitly an approach to developing methods with which to meet intelligently the problems of smaller communities or larger societies. Therefore “doubt,” or questions which occupy scientists, are not scientific problems *sui generis* but problems of life (Logic LW12.76):

...science takes its departure of necessity from the qualitative objects, processes, and instruments of the common sense world of use and concrete enjoyments and sufferings.

It is for this reason that the scientific community inquires into problems of the scientific *community* rather than merely into *scientific* problems. Science is not only about resolving doubt as a crisis of belief. It is by definition a communal enterprise directed toward inquiring into the problems of the community. It is only in this way that Dewey’s idea of a scientific inquiry can become a model for social intelligence and planning.

Another thing that sets Dewey’s pragmatism apart from scientific positivism is, according to Shields (2003), that “pragmatism links the scientific attitude with a rich participatory community.” Dewey’s innovation is not that he understands the importance of the scientific community in the inquiry process, but that he also understands this inquiry process as democratic in nature. This suggests that there must not necessarily be a trade-off between scientific expertise and democratic participation in planning processes. If Dewey is right, we might very well foster democratic participation for cognitive rather than moral reasons.

Alan Ryan explains, the ideal of democracy resembled that of science, as “it excluded the fewest alternatives, allowed all ideas a fair shot at being tried out, encouraged progress, and did not rely on authority. [Moreover] democracy offered no guarantees, any more than science...” (Ryan 1995 p.43). Others add (Talissee 2000 p.76):

In democratic discourse, ideas are advanced and examined according solely to the evidence that can be marshalled in their support; conclusions and decisions are taken to be tentative hypotheses, proposals for action, subject to the test of future experience and hence to revision, social status and privilege are as irrelevant as is rhetorical skill.

For Dewey (Westbrook 1998 p.131, with a reference to Putnam):

the quality of inquiry is affected by the degree to which that community is inclusive or exclusive of all the potential, competent participants in that inquiry and by the democratic or undemocratic character of the norms that guide its practice.

Moreover, both science and democracy internalise their self-understanding as *fallible* institutions (cf. Garrison 2000), and it is their unique ability to face up to this fact – to address failure and to improve – that gives them an advantage over known alternatives. In his commitment to *fallibilism* as a source of both scientific and political improvement, Dewey agrees with Popper (1945, 1959). Popper and Dewey differ, however, on the account of the epistemic and political role of community (Ryan 1995 pp.100-101). In contrast to Popper’s fragmented piecemeal engineering, Dewey offers a vision of the public as a “great community” in which people dare to engage in large-scale social reform projects, so long as these fulfil three conditions:

Deliberation must be inclusive and potentially engage all affected participants;

The methods and norms applied in deliberation must be compatible with a democratic commitment;

The deliberation process must be flexible and open-ended. It should neither start by establishing incontrovertible premises nor end with irreversible judgements.

Avoiding Two Extremes

Dewey explicitly encouraged social experiments and did not, like Popper, restrict them to incremental adjustments, while he abhorred large-scale social experiments of the kind he witnessed during his own lifetime. We cannot altogether avoid all large-scale social experiments: the formation of states and democracy itself is for Dewey an “experiment-in-the-making” (Boisvert 1998, 78).

The following quote could be read as a direct rebuttal of both comprehensive utopian social planning and unguided trial and error incrementalism (PP, LW2.257):

It is not the business of political philosophy and science to determine what the state in general should or must be. What they may do is to aid in creation of methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly, less at the mercy of accident, more intelligently, so that men may learn from their errors and profit by their successes.

In deliberative democracy Dewey sees part of a solution to the dilemma between grand utopian visions and blind trial and error procedures. As we have seen, democratic institutions are for Dewey not merely a guarantee against abusive and dehumanising social experiments, they also incorporate the spirit of free and un-coerced scientific inquiry. Hence democracy promises to be a most effective tool in employing our knowledge, intelligence and foresight to achieve improvements.

For Dewey, intelligence is a social property because it incorporates individual achievements as well as individual failures into a collective method of inquiry and learning. Dewey charges some liberals with confusing complacency with social intelligence and thereby wasting the potential of the scientific attitude (LSA LW 11.32–3):

The doctrine of *laissez faire* was applied to intelligence as well as to economic action, although the conception of experimental method in science demands a control by comprehensive ideas, projected in possibilities to be realized by action. Scientific method is as much opposed to go-as-you-please in intellectual matters as it is to reliance upon habits of mind whose sanction is that they were formed by ‘experience’ in the past. The theory of mind held by early liberals advanced beyond dependence upon the past but it

did not arrive at the idea of experimental and constructive intelligence.

Democracy and Effective Social Intelligence

The idea that knowledge and truth can be communicated and shared makes Dewey optimistic about deliberative democracy as a form of scientific inquiry. He makes the important claim that “social-” or “effective intelligence” can be democratic in its very nature. His notion of “effective intelligence” is opposed to the enlightenment understanding of a “fixed and given reason” (Gouinlock 1996, xxxiii). This distinction can be compared with the definition of “intelligence” as either a specific *individually* possessed *talent* to perform complex analytical tasks, or as any effective social *condition* that enables people to apply adequate solutions to their complex problems. The latter depends much on social, technical and infrastructural conditions and less on individual talent to perform mental and computational tasks. As discussed above, sceptics worry much that democratic forms of collective deliberation will suffer severely where too many members have only a modest intellectual capacity. They would raise the concern that any form of participative democracy will manifest collective folly and impudence just as much as collective intelligence or wisdom.

Dewey’s “social intelligence” or “intelligence in operation,” in contrast, exists in culturally transmitted learned habits and practices. It draws from the stock of available knowledge in a society and it uses instruments of communication and education for their transmission. Moreover, it uses differences in beliefs and opinions as resources in a creative search for viable conceptions of associated life.

Dewey believes in the human powers of reflection, anticipation, and communication as tools of intelligent collective deliberation. He uses Hume’s metaphor of stepping ‘on the shoulders of giants.’ I.e. he claims that our individual intelligence will be greatly enhanced if we live an associated life that enables collective access to sources of knowledge (PP LW 11.38):

There are few individuals who have the native capacity that was required to invent the stationary steam-engine, locomotive, dynamo or telephone. But there are none so mean that they cannot intelligently utilize these embodiments of intelligence once they are a part of the organized means of associated living. The indictments that are drawn against the intelligence of individuals are in truth indictments of a social order that does not permit the average individual to have access to the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes.

This position is not naïve with respect to the motivation and the quality of individual participation in democratic decisions. In fact, pointing at the role of “social order” as the true culprit of dysfunctionalities in the democratic process is the key for understanding the claim that the cure for the ills of democracy is not less but more democracy. Further, for Dewey this implies a powerful argument against the elitist claim that social planning should rest on experts’ superior intelligence (PP LW 2.366):

A more intelligent state of social affairs, one more informed with knowledge, more directed by intelligence, would not improve original endowments one whit, but it would raise the level upon which the intelligence of all operates. The height of this level is much more important for judgement of public concerns than are differences in intelligence quotients.

And this is evidently discordant with the ideal of “rule of the knower” (Brennan 2016), or with technocratic tendencies to leave the job of planning to a clique of experts.

However, what should planners do when facing a reality of many poorly educated and disinterested clients and a few expensive and well-informed experts? Should they encourage more participation and hope that measures to improve education and communication work? Should they start by engaging large numbers in defining new “public symbols,” as Dewey suggests, or is this too hopeful and perhaps naïve?

I do not think so. While merely opening the floodgates of more and faster communication will not help structuring a policy situation, if planners want to benefit

from the potentials of effective social intelligence, they should indeed work on the framework-conditions of the planning *process* as well as on the achievements of their ends. Building up the right channels of communication, enabling all actual and potential participants to access debates, and not excluding legitimate critical voices are vital in drawing upon this resource. These measures can be realistically achieved in any planning context. Most importantly, however, as democracy should be understood not as a procedure, but as an unfolding experiment, the planner must understand herself as part of the planning situation. She must cautiously define her role in the “shared experience” that a democratic process constitutes. Institutional re-designing cannot be a top-down process.

Dewey takes his faith in democracy not merely from the fairness of numerical equality in balloting procedures, but from the potential for a high quality of democratic deliberation. This potential cannot be taken for granted, however, but depends on much more than equal suffrage. He agrees with Walter Lippman that democracy can fail, but he draws more optimistic conclusions (LSA LW 11.39):

It is useless to talk about the failure of democracy until the source of its failure has been grasped and steps are taken to bring about that type of social organization that will encourage the socialized extension of intelligence.

If social intelligence is to be found in the organisation of associated life rather than in the superior minds of experts or leaders, what sort of organisation should this be? Dewey refuses to give a definite answer as to what an intelligence-promoting social organisation should look like. Institutional arrangements must always remain the outcome of specific democratic inquiry in concrete contexts. However, Dewey discusses in detail the meaning of democracy as a form of associated life that employs intelligence as its method and standard.

I have already gathered some practical advice for planning that follows from Dewey’s “scientific” understanding of democracy as collective intelligence. It must be added that we need not necessarily discount demo-

cratic participation as inferior to experts’ rationality from a cognitive point of view. In fact, we might reject the strong opposition between participation and expertise, and rather search for a new role of experts’ competences within democratic deliberation processes and as a constitutive part of social intelligence. A community that would discount the contribution of learned experts or scientific evidence would violate the understanding of democracy as an internalised scientific attitude just as much as a Lippman-style technocratic society.

Dewey does not advocate the marginalisation of scientific/technological expertise in his opposition to Lippman’s technocratic model. On the contrary, experts occupy a crucial role in the build-up and communication of socially relevant knowledge. Experts must devote themselves constantly to understanding social relations and causal mechanisms, and at the same time refine their methods of inquiry and direct inquiry to “specific social problems” (DeCesare 2012). Experts can mediate and facilitate the democratic deliberation process so that collective intelligent decision-making does not require the “omnicompetent citizen” that Lippman postulated. What is essential is that they understand themselves not as determining the fate of citizens from the vantage point of a managerial elite, but that they define their own place within the very democratic deliberation process they serve to facilitate. Dewey was an early precursor of what would later be coined an advocacy approach (Davidoff 1965). We may go back to Paul Appleby, as quoted by Shields (2003), to understand the role of experts in a Deweyan democracy: “Experts should be on tap, and not on top.”

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